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Announcement of An Invitation to Comment
The Independence Standards Board (ISB) announced the issuance of an Invitation to Comment 
titled “Proposed Recommendation to the Executive Committee of the SEC Practice Section of 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants”.
This Invitation to Comment (ITC) proposes that audit firms confirm their independence annually 
to each public company client’s audit committee or board of directors. If adopted by the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) SEC Practice Section (SECPS) as a 
part of its membership requirements, compliance would be tested as part of its peer review 
program.
The ISB welcomes comments and suggestions on any aspect of the proposed Recommendation 
and in particular on the specific questions described in the document.
The ITC is available on the ISB website http://www.cpaindependence.org/pubs/98-l.htm or by 
calling the ISB at 212-596-6133.
Responses to the ITC should be received by July 23, 1998 and should be addressed to: 
Independence Standards Board 
1211 Avenue of the Americas
6th floor
New York, NY 10036-8775
Attn: ITC 98-1
In addition, responses can be faxed to 212-596-6137 or sent via e-mail to 
isb@cpaindependence.org (subject line should refer to ITC98-1).
Corporate Affairs Division
Pfizer Inc
235 East 42nd Street
New York, NY 10017-5755






1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, NY 10036-8775
Re: ITC98-1
Gentlemen:
In my position as Vice President-Corp orate Governance of Pfizer Inc. I am charged with 
recommending to the Board of Directors procedures which will improve the corporate 
governance structure of the company. The Proposed Recommendation would, in my 
opinion, be a positive addition to good corporate governance. The investing public should 
be able to rely on the opinion of the auditors with respect to the Company’s financial 
statements in making an investment decision. It is vital to such reHance that the auditors 
expressing the opinion be independent.
The Proposed Recommendation would provide positive conformation of that 
independence both through the required statement and the review with the Audit 
Committee. It would be helpful if this process was conducted early in the audit process, 
however, I would leave flexibility to the companies. Since I believe this to be a positive 
development I would support it as a requirement for all auditors.
Very truly yours,
Author: MIME:RBaker@umassd.edu at INTERNET
Date: 7/1/98 12:08 PM
Priority: Normal 
TO: ISB at AICPA3 
Subject: Response to ISB Invitation To Comment
This is a response to ISB Invitation to Comment (ITC 98-1).
My name is C. Richard Baker, and I am Associate Professor of Accounting at 
the University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth. I have been a professor of 
accounting for over twenty years and I have specialized in investigating the 
role of the public accounting profession in society. I have published over 
thirty papers dealing with various subjects in accounting and auditing.
My comments on ITC 98-1 are as follows:
1) Will the proposed Recommendation be helpful in fostering additional 
attention on independence issues by audit committees and their auditors?
If the auditor is required to communicate with an audit committee then the 
Recommendation will be helpful. If the auditor can communicate to the board 
of directors then the Recommendation will not foster additional attention on 
independence issues by audit committees. This is because, if there is no 
audit committee then there cannot be additional attention focused by a 
non-existent committee. The necessary precondition to answering the 
question is that there be an audit committee. Consequently, audit committees 
composed solely of non-executive directors should be required for all public 
companies.
2) Is there a more or equally effective mechanism for promoting audit 
committee evaluation of the independence of the entity's auditor?
Assuming that there is an audit committee, then the emphasis should be 
placed on meetings in which management is not present between the audit 
committee and the auditor. A written communication affirming independence is 
somewhat an matter of form. Substance would entail a mandatory meeting 
between the audit committee and the auditor during the course of which 
independence would be affirmed.
3) Do the benefits of the proposed requirement outweigh its costs?
Assuming that an audit committee exists, and assuming that the audit 
committee is properly carrying out its function, there should already be 
regular meetings between the audit committee and the auditor. Therefore, if 
a company is conforming with best practices in corporate governance, there 
should be no additional cost.
4) Would it be desirable to recommend that the independence confirmation be 
delivered at the time the auditor is appointed for the upcoming audit?
It would be desirable for the auditor to affirm that they are independent 
when they are appointed. However, the required affirmation from the auditor 
to the audit committee would be best made upon completion of the audit and 
prior to the release of the audit report. The audit committee and the 
auditor should meet regulatory without management present in order to discuss 
any issues concerning the audit, including independence.
5) The proposed Recommendation should be adopted for all public companies, 
consequently, the proposal should be a dual recommendation to both the SECPS 
and the ASB.
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Independence Standards Board 
6th Floor
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036-8775 
Attn: ITC 98-1
7087 Parfet Street
Arvada, CO 80004 
(303) 422-3227 
FAX (303) 424-9006 
July 2, 1998
Gentlemen:
I am a retired partner of Ernst & Young and have been in public accounting 
practice for more than 40 years. I am also a former member of the Colorado 
State Board of Accountancy. I am presently completing 4 years as a member of 
the Board of Directors of NASBA.
I have a few comments concerning certain portions of the Proposed 
Recommendation to the Executive Committee of the SECPS of the AICPA. As I am 
not engaged in the auditing business, I do not have any comments concerning the 
first three questions asked. However, with respect to when the auditor should 
provide the written assurance to the client to be audited, from the public's 
perspective, I believe it would better serve the purpose if it is required to be 
delivered on or before the time the proposed auditor is to be appointed. The 
client is less likely to be surprised later on during the audit with an auditor 
independence problem. It just makes good logical sense to me to have the 
independence confirmed in advance of the start of the audit. I recognize there 
may be the need for a few exceptions, but I believe they should be few.
As to the need for a follow-up assurance at the end of the audit, I do not 
believe that is necessary in all instances. I believe the GAAS independence 
requirements should make it unnecessary in most audits. However, when there 
has been a change in the audit team personnel during the course of the audit, 
such as one of the principal's on the audit team going to work elsewhere, I think 
it would be useful to require the auditor to address the independence 
confirmation at the end of the audit in light of the audit team changes. This 
would help both sides focus on the change in personnel, particularly when one of 
the audit team goes to work for the client before the end of the audit.
Concerning the situations where the auditing firm is not a member of the 
SECPS and thus not subject to its rules, I believe it is prudent to have a dual 
submission of the Recommendation to both the SECPS and the Auditing Standards 
Board. While it may take longer for the ASB to fully implement the requirement, 
it still makes sense that all auditing firms be covered by the same compliance 
procedures.
Thank you for this opportunity to comment.
Very truly yours,
copy to Dennis P. Spackman, CPA 
Author: MIME:EdRockman@csi.com at INTERNET
Date: 7/7/98 12:26 PM
Priority: Normal
TO: ISB at AICPA3
Subject: ITC98-1
I am writing in response to the invitation to comment on confirmation of 
auditor independence. I think this is a case of attempting to "fix a 
problem with a rule." If there is a problem with independence in public 
companies, whether perceived or actual, I doubt that submission of a 
boilerplate letter will go very far to fix it. Unless the client's audit 
committee, or the board, actually takes an active role in monitoring 
independence, such a requirement will be meaningless. The firm has already 
taken the position that it is independent by performing the audit and 
issuing its opinion. An effective challenge to that position by the audit 
committee must come from the audit committee. I doubt it would be 
stimulated by the receipt of a boilerplate letter. About the only thing 
this rule would do would be to give peer reviewers another thing to look for 
(i.e., another nit to pick).
I would particularly not recommend taking this to the ASB. The definitional 
problems of determining what clients to apply this to would be challenging.
I am afraid that the temptation would be to apply the recommendation to all 
audits. If there is one thing that private company auditors do NOT need, 
it's another requirement that puts form ahead of substance.
In my opinion, the ISB would perform a greater service with a public 
education campaign aimed at audit committees and boards. This campaign 
would explain the nature and importance of independence. The campaign 
should be aimed at getting the audit committee to think about sensitive 
areas of independence so that members can intelligently question the 
auditors.
As an aside, I note that the boilerplate report uses the term "examination." 
It is my understanding that the general term for opinion services on 
historical financial statements is "audit." The term "examination" is 












Vice President and 
Corporate Controller
9 July 1998
Independence Standards Board 
6th Floor
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Attn.: ITC 98-1
Dear Sirs:
Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. is pleased to comment on the “Proposed Recommendations to the Executive Committee of the SEC 
Practice Section of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.” Although we did not receive the Invitation to Comment 
directly, we believe a corporate response is appropriate.
We are a worldwide supplier of industrial gases and related equipment and selected chemicals. Air Products has more than 16,000 
employees worldwide, operations in 30 countries and annual sales of approximately $5 Billion. We are listed on the New York and 
Pacific Stock Exchanges.
Our comments are formatted to address each of the five questions raised on page 4 of your document.
1. Not necessarily. Auditor independence is required by Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) and therefore 
is presumed with no qualified opinion. If questions arise regarding auditor independence thereby causing the 
potential for a qualified opinion, it would most assuredly be discussed with the Audit Committee. This is best 
handled on an exception basis. The proposed letter will become one more annual boiler plate communication.
2. Ongoing questions and discussions at Audit Committee Meetings should be sufficient.
3. No. Although the costs should be minimal, they are still additional and the benefits, if any, to most companies do not 
warrant any additional costs. Incremental decisions are what lead to too many regulations and the resulting costs.
4. If there was such a requirement it would make most sense to have the discussion at the time of auditor appointment.
5. Since independence is already covered by GAAS, it would be appropriate for consideration to add or amend related 
requirements to be addressed by the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) and apply to all audits - not just those of SEC 




Vice President and Corporate Controller
PEH/JMK-M:\AckermanSL\Data\Word\PEH\Ltr\070998a
c: J. H. Agger
A. J. Gubanich
J. M. Knepp
A Responsible Care® Company
Author: MIME:ammondson@worldnet.att.net at INTERNET
Date: 7/15/98 3:30 PM
Priority: Normal
TO: ISB at AICPA3
Subject: ITC98-1
Imput on questions regarding above.
Question:
1. Doubtful
2. Require all independent auditors to adhere to well defined standards and 
rules
of independence. If independence is defined properly there should be no 
need for additional opinions and the standard opinion should suffice. With 
monitoring through peer review and application of sanctions, there should 
be no need of audit committee concerns regarding independence.
3. Costs would be negligible as well as benefits.
4. See above.
5 . See. above








American Institute of CPAs
Independence Standard Board, 6th Floor
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
ATTN: ITC 98-1
Dear ISB Members:
As a member of the Technical Support Group for the NASBA Ethics Committee, L am taking the 
opportunity to comment on the ISB’s Proposed Recommendation to the Executive Committee of 
the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA on Confirmation of Auditor Independence. My 
comments are made within the context that any standard or requirement of auditor independence 
must be focused on investors’ confidence in the auditing profession. While I feel the current level 
of investor confidence in the profession is strong, the profession must continue to be proactive in 
establishing procedures and standards to maintain that confidence. It would be a mistake in 
judgement to wait until a lack of confidence arises to establish procedures to try to reestablish 
confidence.
The mission of the ISB is to establish independence standards applicable to the audits of public 
entities in order to serve the public interest and to protect and promote investors’ confidence in 
the securities markets. The ISB Proposal to require discussion with an entity’s management and 
written confirmation regards to auditor independence is congruent with the ISB mission and best 
interest of the public profession. Specifically:
1. The proposed Recommendation will be helpful in focusing additional attention on 
independence issues by audit committees and/or boards of directors and their auditors. While 
it is not reasonable for all boards of directors or even audit committees to be familiar with all 
the rules which constitute auditor independence, an open discussion on the subject with their 
auditors, accompanied by a confirmation letter, would enhance awareness of independence 
issues and further assure public confidence in the audit process.
2. The proposed Recommendation seems to be an effective mechanism for promoting audit 
committee evaluation of the independence of the entity’s auditors. A formal meeting of the 
auditors and the entity’s audit committee will not take a great deal of time but will cause 
more careful scrutiny and awareness of independence issues for both the entity and auditor.
3. The perceived benefits of increased entity awareness and direct accountability of the auditor, 
which should help preserve investors’ confidence in the audit process, are well worth the 
incremental costs of implementing the Recommendation.
4. It seems most desirable to confirm independence at the time of auditor appointment. Once 
an audit is underway it becomes difficult and costly to make adjustments necessary to deal 
with a perceived independence issue. Moreover, if the report on independence is not 
required at the inception of an audit, perhaps with the engagement letter, some of the benefit 
will be lost. The entity’s board of directors or audit committee should consider auditor 
independence as an important factor in auditor selection. Auditors should establish their 
independence with the entity as part of their proposal process.
5. The proposed Recommendation should be applied to all auditors of U.S. public companies. 
More stringent requirements for auditors belonging to the SECPS does not seem in the best 
interest of the profession. If a standard is appropriate, all who practice the profession should 
be held to it.
The proposal should be a dual recommendation to both the SECPS and the ASB. The SECPS 
Executive Committee can not only implement the Recommendation more expeditiously, but can 
have greater influence on the ASB implementation process through SECPS implementation. 
Furthermore, the SECPS has a responsibility to help foster standards that promote the interests of 
the auditing profession and the general public.
In summary, the proposed Recommendation of the ISB on Confirmation of Auditor 
Independence is an efficient and effective mechanism to help promote and assure auditor 
independence and help continue investors’ confidence in the reporting process.
Respectively submitted,
Clifford R. Skousen, Ph.D., CPA
Ernst & Young Professor and Head
cc D. Spackman, Chairman 
NASB A Ethics Committee
International Federation 
of Accountants
535 Fifth Avenue, 26th Floor Tel: (212)286-9344
New York, New York 10017 Fax: (212) 286-9570
Internet: http://www.ifac.org
Office of the Chair
IFAC Ethics Committee
Marilyn Pendergast Tel: (518) 449-3166
66 State Street Fax: (518) 427-8259
Albany, New York 12207
Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor 
New York, New York 10036-8775
Attn: ITC 98-1 15th July 1998
Dear Sirs,
Confirmation of Auditor Independence
The Ethics Committee of the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) is pleased to 
have this opportunity to respond to the Board’s Invitation to Comment on the proposed 
recommendation to the SEC Practice Section of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (SECPS)
The IFAC Ethics Committee agrees that the proposed recommendation would be helpful in 
focusing the attention of audit committees and Boards of Directors of companies on the 
important issues related to auditor independence and foster greater understanding of these 
issues within SEC registered companies management without adding any significant additional 
costs to the company.
We concur with the proposed recommendation that the timing of the notification and 
discussion be flexible since the relationship of the client and the auditor is the best 
determinate of when and in what manner the required information should be communicated.
Because the requirement for independence is already clearly embodied in generally accepted 
auditing standards, changes in auditing standards, which would affect privately-held 
companies as well as those which are regulated would not appear to be appropriate.
The IFAC Ethics Committee notes that auditors of foreign companies registered with the 
SEC may not be members of the SECPS and therefore, this requirement, as proposed, would 
not extend to those auditors. The ISB might consider whether a recommendation to the SEC 
that similar guidelines for auditor notification regarding independence in accordance with the 
IFAC Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants be established for auditors of foreign 
registrants who are not members of the SECPS.
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1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
Re: Proposed Recommendation to the Executive Committee of the SEC 
Practice Section of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (ITC 98-1)
Dear Board Members:
We support the ITC’s proposal that the auditor should confirm the audit firm’s inde­
pendence to the audit committee and offer to discuss the subject further. The confirma­
tion and offer would be constructive additions to the current communications between 
the auditor and the audit committee. An SECPS membership requirement requiring the 
confirmation and offer should be consistent with the spirit and requirements of SAS 61, 
building on the communication process already established.
In one respect the ITC’s recommendation is not fully consistent with the approach in 
SAS 61. The SAS allows oral communications to the audit committee, whereas the rec­
ommendation in the ITC would call for a written confirmation in every instance. We 
suggest eliminating the proposed requirement that the confirmation be in writing. The 
SAS 61 process should not be fragmented. A written report would not add in any way to 
the auditor’s obligation to be independent. The proposed written report’s message is 
very brief. A letter is not necessary as documentation, because SAS 61 requires that if 
the option to communicate orally is taken, the communication be documented in the 
working papers.
The confirmation should assert independence under the rules that are relevant to audits 
of SEC registrants and should be no more lengthy than necessary. We therefore suggest 
this language: “we are independent accountants within the meaning of the applicable in­
■■■■ Member Firm of KPMG International
KPMG Peat Marwick llp
KPMG Peat Marwick llp
Page 2
dependence requirements recognized or adopted by the SEC.” The rules “recognized” by 
the SEC at this time are those of the ISB. There is no need to single out the requirements 
of the AICPA. The AICPA recognizes the ISB’s standards as the independence stan­
dards applicable to auditors of SEC registrants. There should be no allowable implica­
tion that the AICPA considers compliance with the rules of the ISB and SEC insufficient 
for audits of SEC registrants.
The ITC nowhere mentions the assurance of audit independence available to the audit 
committee from peer review. Audit independence is an element of quality control speci­
fied in professional standards, and a clean opinion in the triennial peer review means that 
the design and operation of the reviewed firm’s quality control system, which includes 
its independence element, provide reasonable assurance of conforming with professional 
standards. The passage in the ITC that explains the desirability of the proposed confir­
mation in light of its costs (paragraph 6) should therefore acknowledge that the confir­
mation would stand in addition not only to the assurance given by the audit report’s 
statement of compliance with GAAS, but also to the assurance provided by triennial peer 
review. Apart from making the text more complete and accurate, the inclusion would be 
a courtesy, since the ITC’s recommendation is to be addressed to the SECPS and re­
quired quality controls with mandatory peer review is one of the most prominent ele­
ments in the SECPS’s program to improve audit quality. Even in light of peer review the 
recommendation is desirable as a constructive contribution to the communications be­
tween the auditor and the audit committee.
With regard to the specific questions asked in the ITC:
1. The degree to which the proposal will focus additional auditor and audit committee 
attention on independence issues cannot be known. It will provide confirmations by 
auditors and occasions for independence to be discussed, which we think are sufficient 
reasons for the requirement. We do not believe there is a need to focus significant new 
attention on auditor independence, and the ITC brings to bear no evidence or argument 
justifying such attention. The context should be constructive communications between 
the auditor and the audit committee.
2. No mechanism, including the one recommended, can practicably promote effective 
audit committee “evaluations” of the auditor’s independence. Each committee on such a 
quest would at least have to master the applicable rules, bring to bear evidence-gathering 
skills and evaluative techniques, and obtain and assess the evidence of compliance with
KPMG Peat Marwick llp
Page 3
the rules. A fuller evaluation would include learning the quality controls and safeguards 
the firm employs, determining compliance with them, and assessing the effect of this 
system on the engagement team. Apart from the feasibility of achieving effective 
evaluations, the attempts to achieve them would radically change the cost-benefit ratio. 
The costs to the shareholders would be the dominant costs of the proposal, and they are 
not mentioned in paragraph 6 at the moment. Statements or implications that evaluations 
can be practicable either as a result of the proposal or by other means should not appear 
in follow-on documents.
It is not clear why this question was asked. It has no direct link to the recommendation, 
which does not involve an audit committee evaluation of audit independence. The con­
firmation would provide assurance, and the optional discussion could elaborate on that 
assurance as well as improve a director’s understanding of audit independence. The 
audit committee could thereby obtain an additional measure of satisfaction as to audit 
independence, which would be one of the recommendation’s benefits. But the receipt of 
such assurance is not an evaluation of audit independence. Moreover, paragraph 7, 
which mistakenly implies in sentence 2 that knowledge of the independence rules alone 
would be sufficient to make the determination, says the Board concluded that the audit 
committee could not determine the auditor’s independence.
3. The benefits will exceed the costs, assuming the recommendation is set in the frame­
work of routine SAS 61 communications between auditors and audit committees.
4. No. The confirmation should be a normal part of the communications between the 
auditor and the audit committee governed by the approach in SAS 61. Paragraph 9 of the 
discussion section suggests the Board favors following the SAS 61 approach on timing.
5. The recommendation should be submitted to the SECPS, not to the ASB and not to 
both, despite the fact that some small number of auditors are not members of the SECPS. 
The flexibility of SAS 61, the modest nature of the proposal, and the small number of 
auditors of SEC registrants who might escape the requirement argue against disregarding 
the regulatory symmetries now in place. The jurisdictions of the ISB and the SECPS are 
restricted to audits of SEC registrants, whereas the ASB has responsibilities for stan­
dards governing all audits, not just audits of SEC registrants. GAAS requires audit inde­
pendence, but the ASB has generally looked elsewhere for independence rules, never 
getting into implementation requirements. Moreover, it is far more important for the 
nonmember auditors to join the SECPS and become subject to its full program of audit
KPMG Peat Marwick llp
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quality than for them to adopt the recommended communication as nonmembers. The 
AICPA has done all it could to maximize the inclusion in the SECPS of all auditors of 
SEC registrants. The SEC should require that the remaining auditors be members.
***
Thank you for the opportunity to submit these comments. We would be happy to explain 
further any of them that are unclear or raise questions. Inquiries may be directed to John 
Guinan 0guinan@kpmg.com).
Sincerely,
KPMG Peat Marwick LLP
Clifton
Gunderson P.l.c.
Certified Public Accountants & Consultants
2700 Westown Parkway, Suite 200 







1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8875
Dear Members:
I submit the following thoughts and comments concerning ITC 98-1:
1) It is not clearly defined as to the time of confirmation of independence. I would encourage 
the Committee to require the confirmation of independence prior to the time the auditor is 
selected or as part of the selection process.
2) I endorse the independence confirmation process and encourage meetings with the audit 
committee as part of this process. I recommend the Board consider stronger language for 
encouraging meetings with the audit committee.
3) I disagree with the Board’s approach in Item 9 to timing of the independence confirmation. 
It should be part of the process in the selection and approval process for auditors by the 
audit committee.
Thank you for your consideration.
Sincerely
Ronald E. Nielsen, CPA, CFE, CVA, ABV
REN/my









1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036-8775 
Attn: ITC 98-1
Gentlemen:
The Audit Issues Task Force (AITF) of the AICPA Auditing Standards Board (ASB) has taken 
the opportunity to read and consider your Invitation to Comment, Proposed Recommendation to 
the Executive Committee of the SEC Practice Section of the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants.
The AITF members support your objective to increase the dialog between auditors and their 
clients on auditor independence. We look forward to considering the comments you receive 
about whether this matter should be put on the ASB’s agenda.
The AITF consists of seven of the ASB’s fifteen members. Among its various duties, the AITF 
serves as the ASB’s planning committee and considers which matters are put on the ASB’s 
agenda.
Very truly yours,





Audit and Attest Standards 
cc: Auditing Standards Board
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10036-8775 (212) 596-6200 • fax (212) 596-6213
The CPA . Never Underestimate The Value.SM
Fax Transmission
TN State Board of Accountancy
500 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville. TN 372-43-1 41
Fax: (615) 532-8800
Independence Standards Board Date: July 21, 1998To:
Fax #: (212) 596-6137 Pages: Two (2), including this cover 
sheet.
From: Don Hummel, Administrative 
Director, TN Board of 
Accountancy
Subject: Confirmation of Independence
COMMENTS:
See comments attached. Original follows by mail.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND INSURANCE 
TENNESSEE STATE BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY 
DAVY CROCKETT TOWER. 2nd FLOOR 
500 JAMES ROBERTSON PARKWAY 
NASHVILLE. TENNESSEE 37243-1141 
615-741-2550 OR FAX 615-532-8800
July 21, 1998
Independence Standards Board 
6th Floor
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036-8775
Dear Board:
As a member of the Technical Study Group for the Ethics Committee of the National Association of State 
Boards of Accountancy I have been asked to review and comment on your ITC 98-1 which proposes to require 
firms to confirm their independence annually to each public company client’s audit committee or board of 
directors.
The comments herein are made as a member of the study group identified above and do nor reflect the 
opinions or beliefs of the Tennessee State Board of Accountancy.
One of the major qualities that a CPA brings to the audit environment is independence. In my mind anything 
that brings more focus to the issue of independence in the auditor's mindset and to the audit committee or 
board of directors as well, is good. I think especially that bringing a focus on independence to the audit 
committe or board of directors is needed. If that entity is fully aware of the importance of independence then 
the firm and auditor will necessarily be vitally concerned with independence. I know of no more effective 
mechanism than a bilateral focus of both the seller and buyer.
My impression is that it would be desirable to recommend that the independence confirmation be delivered at 
the time that the auditor is appointed. And, in my opinion there should be a dual recommendation to both the 
SECPS and the ASB. The more emphasis from regulators the better. As your paper states, the cost should 
be nominal and the benefits would outweigh that cost.




Independence Standards Board 
6th Floor
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-875
Attention: ITC 98-1
Gentlemen:
We are pleased to comment on the Independence Standards Board's proposed recommendation 
ITC 98-1 and the five questions therein. This proposed recommendation encourages the 
AICPA's SEC Practice Section Executive Committee to require member firms to annually 
confirm independence to each public company, which we will refer to as "confirmation." In 
some, but not all, of our engagement letters this firm already provides this confirmation.
Question 1. The confirmation will slightly increase attention to independence issues by audit 
committees, since they will read an additional paragraph in the engagement letter, SAS 61 
letter, or other communication, specifically stating the auditor is independent. Some audit 
committees may wonder why the obvious is being stated. We think auditors of public 
companies already devote considerable attention to independence issues and thus the 
incremental additional attention by auditors due to this confirmation will be minor.
Question 2. A more effective mechanism for promoting audit committee evaluation of auditor 
independence awaits more "principle-based" independence standards. As acknowledged in 
paragraph 7 of the Invitation, current independence rules contain many interpretations, 
circumstances, and other items to consider. Communicating the workings of today's rules and 
interpretations to an audit committee may require more effort than it provides in 
enlightenment. Accordingly, we encourage the ISB to move quickly to a more principles-based 
system.
Question 3. The benefits from this confirmation are probably minor, in that most audit 
committees already focus on independence in a general way. The costs are probably minor, 
since we anticipate the confirmation will become a ritual paragraph inserted in an engagement 
or other letter. Indeed, if the peer review process is to scrutinize whether this confirmation was 
delivered, as the proposed recommendation suggests, the confirmation will most likely become 
a ritualized process to ensure compliance.
Question 4. The timing of the confirmation is problematic, but it is probably better delivered at 
or near the end of the audit. At the commencement of the audit, the auditor is probably least 
likely to have an independence conflict, and thus the confirmation would have the smallest 
significance. The confirmation at this point also would be prospective ("we intend to stay
CROWE, CHIZEK AND COMPANY LLP
330 EAST JEFFERSON BOULEVARD POST OFFICE BOX 7 SOUTH BEND, INDIANA 46624 219.232.3992 FAX 219.236.8692 A member of Horwath International
independent accountants"), and thus weaker, because the auditor can not realistically confirm 
their independence during the audit until the audit has occurred. A confirmation after 
completion of the audit could follow the wording suggested in paragraph 4 of the Invitation 
("Relating to our examination ...we are independent accountants..."). Such a confirmation 
would also cover the entire period of the audit, and not be prospective. If, as stated in 
paragraph 8 of the Invitation, the issuance of the auditor's report serves to reaffirm that the 
auditor was independent, there may be no need for an incremental confirmation—just refer the 
audit committee to the auditor's report.
Question 5. The SECPS requirement reaches all but a handful of audits of U.S. public 
companies, and thus appears sufficient. The incremental cost to develop an auditing standard 
via the Auditing Standards Board, versus the small number of additional audits to be covered, 
does not appear justified.
Additional comments follow.
The proposed language of the confirmation could be improved. In the optional lead-in, we 
suggest revising the words "is required to issue to the company's audit committee or board of 
directors a report confirming the auditor's independence under the applicable rules." To better 
express the point, we suggest instead: "to confirm to the company's audit committee or board of 
directors that it is independent under the applicable rules."
We suggest the proposed language of the confirmation refer to "audit" instead of 
"examination."
The last sentence of the document does not remind the reader that the independence 
representation is required by a principal auditor because generally accepted auditing standards 
require it, and not necessarily because the principal auditor has a separate desire for such a 
representation.
We note that only one of the 10 generally accepted auditing standards, independence, has been 
singled out for this recommended confirmation. Other standards, including technical training 
and proficiency, due professional care, adequate planning and supervision, sufficient internal 
control understanding to plan, and sufficient competent evidential matter obtained, are also 
considered important and may, if missing, perhaps lead to more audit failures than lack of 
independence. We are not suggesting that these other items be added to the confirmation, only 
that careful cost-benefit considerations be undertaken as to the one standard selected for 
confirmation.
If there are questions, please call Jim Brown.
Very truly yours,
  THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNAL AUDITORS Professional
Development
July 21, 1998









1211 Avenue of Americas, 6th floor
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Art:
Thank you for your personal invitation for commentary on the Independence Standards Board's (ISB) proposed 
recommendation to the SEC Practice Section (SECPS) of the AICPA. The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) is 
pleased to comment on the proposed recommendation. The Board’s objective of improving auditor independence 
requirements is of urgent importance to The IIA and all professional financial organizations.
Although you did not ask for an overall conclusion, we believe the proposed recommendation should not be presented, 
at least in its present form. Our reasoning follows:
a) A standard confirmation seems to be redundant. Auditors already affirm to the world the independence of 
their mental attitude as required by GAAS in their specific warranty contained in the standard audit report.
b) A standard confirmation asserting independence, particularly one provided at the beginning of the audit 
 process, would not communicate how a firm did comply with the requirement to “be independent in fact and
appearance when providing auditing and other attestation services” as stated in AICPA Code of Professional 
Conduct, Article IV.
c) A standard confirmation is likely to be a stereotyped routine communication that may not improve directors’ 
understanding of independence issues.
d) It is unwise to place additional focus on the current highly technical and complex ethics rules. The time and 
resources spent to convince directors of the effectiveness of current standards may well detract from or delay 
achievement of ISB’s goal of developing a new conceptual framework for auditor independence.
e) Without substantial amplification, the SECPS peer review program would be unable to effectively test 
compliance with existing independence rules, i.e. measure the success of a firm's systems designed to achieve 
stated behavioral objectives. Current quality control standards relating to independence are largely 
definitional and do not describe the “matters essential to the effective design, implementation, and 











Although we do not favor the proposal as stated, we are very much in agreement with the Board’s objective of 
increasing meaningful dialog between auditors and audit committees. To accomplish this objective, the Board should 
carefully consider several of the recommendations made by the Public Oversight Board in its monograph: 
Strengthening the Professionalism of the Independent Auditor and its pamphlet: Directors, Management, and 
Auditors: Allies in Protecting Shareholder Interests. In addition, we suggest consideration of an additional 
requirement that a firm at the end of the audit should communicate to the audit committee substantively what steps the 
firm took to achieve the requirement of maintaining an independent mental attitude and appearance of independence. 
This discussion could well be framed within the context of communicating qualitative judgements about accounting 
principles, disclosures, and estimates.
The following answers directly address the numbered questions in the invitation for comments:
1) No, while it is difficult to say that this activity may not be helpful, we believe the additional attention given to 
independence by directors will be marginal.
2) Yes, as stated above, a focus on communicating how the firm achieved the required behavior objectives would 
be more effective. Further, if the Board’s primary objective is to promote audit committee evaluation of 
independence, this factor should be set forth more prominently.
3) No, since we believe that the benefits would be marginal, the recommendation may divert attention and 
resources away from the Board's long-term goals of developing a comprehensive framework for auditor 
independence.
4) No, this would stereotype the requirement into a predictive promise that would not be responsive to generally 
accepted auditing standards. We believe the alternative suggested in response to question #2 would be most 
effective.
5) Yes, the recommendation should be made jointly for the reasons stated.
Established in 1941, The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) is an international professional organization with world­
headquarters in Altamonte Springs, FL. The IIA has nearly 70,000 members in internal auditing, governance, 
internal control, IT audit, education, and security. With representation from more than 100 countries, The Institute is 
the acknowledged leader in certification, education, research, and technological guidance for the internal auditing 
profession worldwide.
Best regards,
William G. Bishop III, CIA
CC: Executive Committee
Professional Issues Committee
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U.S. CITIES AND ABROAD
July 21, 1998
Hon. William T. Allen, Chairman 
Independence Standards Board 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036
Dear Judge Allen:
I have been a licensed and practicing Certified Public Accountant for 
over 50 years. I have signed dozens (and possibly hundreds) of audit re­
ports for inclusion in filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
and I am impelled to describe the May 29, 1998 "proposed recommendation" 
as redundant and as a charade.
To have KPMG Peat Marwick advise General Electric, after many years, 
that they are independent, to have Deloitte & Touche (successor to Haskins 
& Sells) advise General Motors, after many years, that they are inde­
pendent, to have Price Waterhouse advise Chase Manhattan, after many years, 
that they are independent - is just plain silly. If a CPA does not under­
stand and adhere to Rule 101 "Independence" of the AICPA Code of Professional 
Conduct, they should be shunned and shamed.
The real heart of auditor independence is not ownership of shares in a 
client company, but rather the exercise of management activities by the 
"independent" auditor. The Fried Frank "White Paper" which was described 
as "educational materials bearing on the conceptual framework for protecting 
and enhancing auditor independence" was, in fact, an advocacy document for 
management and consulting services by "independent” auditors. Page 50 of 
the "White Paper" carries the caption, "There is No Evidence that the Per­
formance of Non-Audit Services by Accounting Firms for Audit Clients Im­
pairs Independence in Fact." Further, the "White Paper" does an injustice 
to former Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Harold Williams under 
whose leadership Accounting Series Releases (ASR) 250 and 264 were promul­
gated. There was a time when the term used was "Management Advisory Services 
(MAS)," later converted to "Management Services (MS)," and now the dubious 
description is "Consulting." Chairman Williams knew that by any other name 
such services could intrude into the independent nature of the independent 
auditors' services. ASR 250 and ASR 264 both were a step in the right 
direction but were opposed by a segment of the accounting profession, and 
with a change of political administration in 1981, ASR 250 and ASR 264 
were rescinded. I respectfully recommend that the members of the ISB reread 
ASR 250 and ASR 264 which were written by prophets at the SEC.
Hon William T. Allen, Chairman
July 21, 1998
Page 2
Right on point is the attached recent article written by Ms. Melody 
Petersen entitled, ’’Consulting by Auditors Stirs Concern,” (The New York 
Times, July 13, 1998). The article starts, ’’Federal securities regulators 
have grown increasingly concerned that the accounting industry’s lucrative 
expansion into computer consulting may be creating conflicts with the 
accountants' role of being watchdogs for investors." Also, right on point 
is the attached recent article written by Ms. Joann S. Lublin and 
Ms. Elizabeth MacDonald, entitled, "Scandals Signal Laxity of Audit Panels" 
(Wall Street Journal, July 16, 1998). Please note the following sentences 
in this article: "Too many audit committees are turning out to be tooth­
less tigers." and "Investor activists have long attacked such panels for 
lacking enough independence or financial expertise to uncover most management 
misdeeds."
Also enclosed is Wall Street Journal full page ad inserted by Ernst & 
Young containing the verbiage "we helped a multinational manufacturer accel­
erate its product development cycle time by 30%." Also enclosed are lead 
sheets of SEC Administrative Complaint against KPMG Peat Marwick in the matte 
of KPMG Baymark. The SEC recently concluded two weeks of testimony against 
KPMG Peat Marwick before an Administrative Law Judge in which the SEC con­
tended, among other things, that KPMG Peat Marwick made a six figure loan 
to the President of one of its audit clients.
Judge Allen, the real challenge to the four public members of the ISB is 
whether they will act with courage, objectivity and independence. After all, 
the Public Oversight Board (POB) during 20 years looked at "independence" 
time and again and never proposed a real solution thereby making it necessary 
for the new ISB to be created by pressure from the current Chairman of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. /







U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
Washington, D.C.
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 .
Release No. 39400/December 4, 1997
ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING ENFORCEMENT
Release No. 994/ December 4, 1997 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
File No. 3-9500
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS IN THE MATTER OF KPMG PEAT 
MARWICK LLP
The Commission announced today that it has instituted public administrative 
proceedings to determine if KPMG Peat Marwick engaged in improper professional 
conduct and violated and caused violations of the federal securities laws by issuing an 
unqualified report on the 1995 year-end financial statements of a client from which it 
lacked independence.
According to the allegations of the Commission’s Division of Enforcement and 
Office of the Chief Accountant:
In approximately January 1995, KPMG Peat Marwick organized and capitalized 
KPMG BayMark, a firm owned by Edward R. Olson and three others. KPMG 
Peat Marwick planned to use KPMG BayMark as a vehicle to engage in new lines 
of business, including the “corporate, turnaround” business. Later in 1995, as part 
of a turnaround engagement, KPMG BayMark installed its principal Olson as the 
President and Chief Operating Officer of Porta Systems Corp., a financially 
troubled audit client of KPMG Peat Marwick’s Long Island office.
When KPMG Peat Marwick audited Porta's 1995 year-end financial statements 
and prepared its audit report, KPMG Peat Marwick’s financial and business 
relationships with its audit client Porta and with KPMG BayMark impaired KPMG 
Peat Marwick's independence from its audit client, in both fact and appearance. In 
particular, KPMG Peat Marwick lacked independence because: (1) KPMG Peat 
Marwick had loaned $100,000 to the President/COO of its audit client Porta; (2) 
KPMG Peat Marwick had capitalized the separate business owned by the 
President/COO of its audit client Porta; (3) KPMG Peat Marwick had capitalized 
the “affiliate” of its audit client Porta; (4) KPMG Peat Marwick was entitled to a 
percentage of the earnings, disposed inventory and restructured debt of its audit client 
Porta; and (5) by reason of their contractual ties and interdependence, KPMG Peat 
Marwick and KPMG BayMark should be considered a single entity for independence 
purposes.
Despite warnings from the staff of the Commission’s Office of the Chief 
Accountant concerning independence issues arising from KPMG Peat Marwick’s 
relationship with KPMG BayMark, KPMG Peat Marwick completed its audit of 
Porta's financial statements and issued its "Independent Auditors' Report," which 
represented that it had “conducted [its] audits in accordance with generally 
accepted auditing standards” (“GAAS”). This statement was false and misleading 
in that GAAS requires auditors to be independent of their audit clients both in fact 
and in appearance?\
The Division of Enforcement and the Office of the Chief Accountant further allege 
that, by conducting an audit of Porta’s 1995 year-end financial statements and rendering 
an audit opinion thereon at a time it lacked independence from Porta, KPMG Peat 
Marwick, among other things: (1) rendered Porta’s 1995 annual report on Form 10-K 
materially false and misleading in that the financial statements contained therein were not, 
as represented and as required by Section 13(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, audited by independent accountants, thus causing Porta to violate Section 13(a) of 
the Exchange Act and Rule 13a-1 thereunder; (2) directly violated Rule 2-02 of 
Commission Regulation S-X, which requires that auditors be independent of their audit 
clients; and (3) engaged in improper professional conduct under Rule 102(e)(1)(h) of the 
Commission's Rules of Practice.
A hearing will be scheduled to determine whether the allegations against KPMG 
Peat Marwick are true and, if so, what remedial actions, if any, are appropriate.
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ILLINOIS CPA SOCIETY
222 S. Riverside Plaza 
Chicago, IL 60605
Phone: 312/993-0407 or 800/993-0407 
FAX: 312/993-9954
July 22,1998
Independence Standards Board 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
6th Floor
New York, New York 10036-8775
Attn: ITC 98-1
The Auditing Services Committee of the Illinois CPA Society (Committee) is pleased to have the 
opportunity to comment to the May 29, 1998 ISB Invitation To Comment 98-1, Proposed 
Recommendation to the Executive Committee of the SEC Practice Section of the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants. The organization and operating procedures of the 
Committee are reflected in the Appendix A to this letter. The Committee offers the following 
comments to question 3 in the invitation to comment:
3) Do the benefits of the proposed requirement outweigh the costs?
Although the costs of this proposed requirement may be minimal, the Committee believes it 
provides little benefit. Further, the Committee questions the appropriateness of imposing a 
requirement for auditors to explicitly confirm their independence for the stated purpose of 
increasing auditors' and audit committees' focus on independence issues. The Committee also 
questions whether issuance of such a confirmation will encourage discussion of independence 
between auditors and audit committees and achieve the desired improvement in audit committees' 
understanding of independence issues.
The Committee recommends that the Board consider other approaches to meeting the objectives 
stated in the invitation to comment, such as continuing education and practice-monitoring 
programs for auditors and through educational information for members of audit committees.
We also noted that the recommended confirmation letter refers to the auditors' “examination,” 
which we recommend be changed to “audit.”
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the invitation to comment. Should you have any 
questions regarding our comments, please don’t hesitate to call me at 630/574-7878.
Sincerely,
James A. Dolinar
Chairman, Auditing Services Committee
APPENDIX A
ILLINOIS CPA SOCIETY 
AUDITING SERVICES COMMITTEE 
ORGANIZATION AND OPERATING PROCEDURES 
1998 -1999
The Auditing Services Committee of the Illinois CPA Society (Committee) is composed of 20 
technically qualified, experienced members appointed from industry, education and public accounting. 
These members have Committee service ranging from newly appointed to more than 15 years. The 
Committee is an appointed senior technical committee of the Society and has been delegated the 
authority to issue written positions representing the Society on matters regarding the setting of auditing 
standards.
The Committee usually operates by assigning Subcommittees of its members to study and discuss fully 
exposure documents proposing additions to or revisions of auditing and attest standards. The 
Subcommittee ordinarily develops a proposed response which is considered, discussed and voted on by 
the full Committee. Support by the full Committee then results in the issuance of a formal response, 
which at times, includes a minority viewpoint..
Author: MIME:SpackmanDP@ldschurch.org at INTERNET
Date: 7/22/98 11:57 AM
Priority: Normal
TO: ISB at AICPA3
Subject: Response to ITC 98-1






1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
Re: ITC98-1, Request for Comment on Confirmation of Auditor Independence
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the invitation to comment on the proposed, 
Recommendation to the Executive Committee of the SEC Practice Section of the-AICPA on, 
Confirmation of Auditor Independence.
Matters of independence are a serious concern to state boards of accountancy. While 
considerable guidance exists in the accounting profession’s Code of Conduct and its Practice 
Standards concerning independence, continuing vigilance is needed to make sure they are 
maintained current to assure their effectiveness in today’s rapidly changing business world. I 
respect and appreciate the ISB’s mission and diligence in seeking to establish independence 
standards for auditors of public entities which will serve to protect and promote investor’s 
confidence in our securities markets.
My comments on the proposed Recommendation follow:
1. Will the proposed Recommendation be helpful in fostering additional attention on 
independence issues by audit committees and their auditors?
The proposed recommendation may be helpful. In some situations it may in fact provide 
impetus for the opportunity for an open discussion on the subject of independence and 
thereby enhance the awareness of independence issues between auditors and members of 
audit committees or boards of directors. This will benefit public confidence in the audit 
process.
However, its essence is such that it may simply become a perfunctory act. What this 
requirement lacks is a compelling need or benefit which would carry it beyond its current 
destined simple delivery of a written report which is not likely to be read, and invitation to 
meet which may not be taken up.
Those who engage CPAs to do audits expect them to be independent and feel no need to 
give the issue any more thought. Most engagement letters confirm the CPA’s 
independence and, their report on the entity’s financial statements also asserts their 
independence. The problem with the Recommendation is that it appears redundant to these 
events.
The objective of increasing or establishing meaningful dialogue between the audit 
committee and board of directors, and the auditors over independence has merit. 
Unfortunately, this recommendation lacks a persuasive need, apparent benefit, or stated 
behavioral objective that would give cause for these dialogues to occur with a meaningful 
expected outcome.
2. Is there a more or equally effective mechanism for promoting audit committee evaluation of 
the independence of the entity’s auditors?
The Recommendation could be strengthened by incorporating within it the outcomes of the 
auditor’s initial considerations and assessment of independence made prior to acceptance of 
the audit engagement. Incorporating the outcomes of the initial assessment into pre 
engagement communications with the audit committee or board of directors would benefit 
all parties. Such pre engagement communications could create an environment which 
would give meaningful attention to independence as a condition necessary to a successful 
audit engagement. It would also facilitate the setting in place of behavioral expectations 
for the auditor and, management and staff of the entity being audited. Similarly, the 
engagement letter might have incorporated within it agreed to actions and behavioral 
outcomes relative to recognized independence matters which would help assure 
independence.
At the conclusion of the engagement the auditor should provide a confirmation report to 
the audit committee or board of directors concerning independence. The independence 
confirmation could be incorporated into the SAS 61 letter and discussed with the audit 
committee or board of directors. The report and discussion could reference various issues 
encountered during the course of the engagement and the effectiveness of related actions 
taken to maintain independence. These matters could be made more meaningful to the 
audit committee or board of directors if the auditor discussed them in relation to the 
auditor’s assertion of independence in the report on the entity’s financial statements.
The strength of this approach is that it keeps the auditor focused on current in-place 
requirements related to independence such as, the initial assessment of independence and, 
the need to remain independent during the course of the engagement in order to assert 
independence in the auditor’s report on the financial statements.
3. Do the benefits of the proposal outweigh its costs?
Costs would be negligible.
4. Would it be desirable to recommend that the independence confirmation be delivered at the 
time that the auditor is appointed for the upcoming engagement?
While it may be desirable to initiate discussions of independence early in the audit, it is 
essential that independence is maintained throughout the course of the audit as well. The 
engagement letter should be used to communicate the commitment to maintaining 
independence. A report at the end of the engagement which might be incorporated into the 
SAS 61 letter would be a better time to report that independence had been maintained 
throughout the engagement.
5. Should the Recommendation be submitted only to the Executive Committee of the SEC 
Practice Section of the AICPA or, should the proposal be a dual recommendation to both the 
SECTS and the ASB.?
The recommendation should be made to both the SECPS and the ASB.
I hope you find these comments beneficial. Should you have any questions or want to discuss 
them with me, please feel free to call me.
Sincerely,
Dennis
Dennis Paul Spackman, CPA
  Ernst & Young llp ■ 1300 Huntington Building
925 Euclid Avenue 
Cleveland, Ohio 44115-1405
■ Phone: 216 861 5000
July 21, 1998
Mr. William T. Allen, Chairman 
Independence Standards Board 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036-8775
Proposed Recommendation to the Executive Committee 
of the SEC Practice Section of the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (File Reference No. ITC 98-1)
Dear Mr. Allen:
We support the issuance of the above-referenced proposed Recommendation to the Executive 
Committee of the SEC Practice Section of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(SECPS) and believe it is an appropriate initial step by the Independence Standards Board (ISB).
In response to the five questions posed in the Invitation to Comment:
1 .&2. We believe written communications regarding auditor independence will focus attention 
on independence issues by audit committees and will foster more dialogue about them 
with their auditors. We do not believe there is a more or equally effective mechanism for 
promoting audit committee “evaluation” of the independence of an entity’s auditors at 
this time. As cited in paragraph 7 of the “Discussion” portion of the Invitation to 
Comment, we agree an audit committee cannot conclude on the auditors’ independence 
without relying substantially on representations from the auditors. It is for this reason we 
believe the required written communication will promote meaningful dialogue between 
auditors and audit committees regarding independence matters.
Although we believe the confirmation letter recommended in the Invitation to Comment 
is appropriate at this time, we believe the letter should be reconsidered when the ISB 
develops its framework for establishing independence standards. We continue to support 
the principles-based approach set forth in the white paper entitled, Serving the Public 
Interest: A New Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence, and believe 
incorporating those principles in the confirmation letter would better focus the 
auditor/audit committee communications, and in the process enable greater understanding 
among audit committee members of the procedures and safeguards employed by audit 
firms to maintain independence.
3. We believe the benefits of the proposed requirement outweigh its costs.
Ernst & Young llp is a member of Ernst & Young International, Ltd.
  Ernst&Young llp




4. Regarding the timing of the written communications, we believe the discussions between 
audit committees and auditors are most beneficial early in the audit process, for example, 
when the auditor is appointed or reappointed. However, we agree with the 
recommendation to allow flexibility in the timing of the confirmation.
5. We believe a written confirmation of independence is best suited for public companies 
since the objective of the letter is to assist audit committees in performing their oversight 
responsibilities. We do not believe the requirement would be as useful or cost effective 
for non-public companies. Since an SECPS requirement would cover primarily all of the 
auditors of public companies, we suggest not referring the recommendation to the 
Auditing Standards Board.
We propose the following revisions to the model confirmation letter to make it clearer that this 
will be a requirement of member firms:
Audit Committee of the Board of Directors [or The Board of Directors] ABC Company
[Optional - Under the membership requirements of the SEC Practice Section of the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants SEC Practice Section, the auditors of 
a company companies subject to the rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission is 
are required to issue to the company’s companies’ audit committees or boards of directors 
a report letter confirming the auditor’s auditors’ independence under the applicable rules. 
Accordingly, and] R(r)elating to our examination of the financial statements of the ABC 
Company as of December 31, 19X1 and for the year then ended;, we are independent 
certified public accountants with respect to die ABC Company, under the published 
requirements within the meaning of the applicable published rules and regulations of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, and the pronouncements of the Independence 
Standards Board, and under Rule 101 of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants’ Code of Professional Conduct, and its interpretations and rulings. We 
would be pleased to meet with you, at your convenience, to further discuss our 
independence, including the related controls employed by our firm.
We would be pleased to discuss our comments with the Board or its staff.
Sincerely,




PETER J. FAIRLEY, CPA, FCA (U.K.)
ROBERT PARKS, CPA
ROBERT GOTTERER, CPA
400 PARK AVENUE 
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022 
(212) 826-0000
FAX: (212) 421-2583
CORRESPONDENTS IN PRINCIPAL 
U.S. CITIES AND ABROAD
July 22, 1998
Hon. William T. Allen, Chairman
Independent Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036
Re: May 29, 1998 ISB Proposed 
Recommendation
Dear Judge Allen:
Kindly include in my July 21, 1998 letter the enclosed 
Ernst and Young full page ad which appeared in the July 21, 
1998 Wall Street Journal which contains the following: 
"There Isn't A Business We Can't Improve."
Eli Mason
Copy: Hon. Arthur Levitt 
Members of ISB
Respectfully yours,
There Isn't A Business We Can't Improve  ERNST & YOUNG
 
  DePaul University
July 23, 1998
Independence Standards Board 
1211 Avenue of Americas, 6th floor 
New York, NY 10036-8775 
Attn: ITC 98-1
By FAX 212 596-6137
2 pages
Curtis C. Verscboor 
Ledger and Quill Alumni 
Research Professor 
School of Accountancy 
1 East Jackson Boulevard 




As an interested observer who closely follows the Board’s actions and attends meetings at his own 
expense, I hope the following comments will help achieve your objective of improving auditor 
independence requirements. Your mission is of urgent importance to investors, professional 
accountants, and the public at large.
For the following reasons, I believe the proposal should not be adopted
a. A confirmation of required independence would be unnecessary and redundant. As one of the 
specific warranties contained in the standard audit report, auditors already proclaim the independence 
of their mental attitude as required by GAAS, specifically the second general standard..
b. A standard confirmation is likely to be a stereotyped routine communication that may not improve 
directors’ understanding of independence issues. Placing additional focus on the current highly 
technical ethics rules may well delay achievement of ISB’s important goal of developing a new 
conceptual framework for auditor independence.
c. A routine confirmation, particularly one that merely asserts independence at the beginning of the 
audit process, would not communicate meaningful information. A more valuable report would 
describe at the end of the audit how a firm did in fact comply with the requirement to “be independent 
in fact and appearance when providing auditing and other attestation services” as stated in the AICPA 
Code of Professional Conduct, Article IV.
d. Without substantial amplification of present professional guidance, the SECPS peer review 
program would be unable to effectively test a firm’s compliance with existing independence rules, ie. 
measure the success of a firm’s systems that are designed to achieve stated behavioral objectives 
related to independence. Current quality control standards dealing with independence are largely 
definitional and do not describe the “matters essential to the effective design, implementation, and 
maintenance of the system” as stated in AICPA Statement on Quality Control Standards No 20.
Although not in favor of the proposal as stated, I am very much in agreement with the Board’s
objective of increasing meaningful communication about independence from auditors to audit
committees, particularly in view of the many recent examples of undetected 
misleading financial reporting.
A valuable report could take the form of an end of audit statement of what 
substantive steps the firm took to achieve the requirement of maintaining the
lax controls and
 IU 12125966137 P.02
appearance of independence as well as an independent mental attitude in “all matters relating to the 
assignment” as required by SAS No. 1, Section 220. Independence matters could also be included 
within the context of communications to the audit committee already recommended by the Public 
Oversight Board. These include qualitative judgments about accounting principles, disclosures, and 
estimates. Several other recommendations made by the POB in its monograph: Strengthening the 
Professionalism of the Independent Auditor and its pamphlet: Directors, Management, and Auditors: 
Allies in Protecting Shareholder Interests concern the “applied independence” of CPA firms and may 
well harmonize with the Board’s objectives.
One of the important paradigms contained in the AICPA’s White Paper. A New Conceptual 
Framework for Auditor Independence is a recommendation for each firm to create a code of conduct 
for independence supported by effective compliance procedures These should include senior-level 
oversight, extensive training, periodic monitoring, and a confidential hot-line to report violations. 
These are elements of the framework of best practices for achieving ethical behavior and were 
originally developed by the Defense Industry Initiative and later adapted for legal compliance by the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
Although almost all large corporations have codes of conduct or ethics, only one large CPA firm 
presently has an ethics system designed to assure achieve ethical conduct. Unfortunately, the values 
upon which this firm’s code of conduct is based are not appropriate for a CPA firm since they do not 
consider independence and the public interest. I urge the Board to encourage all large firms to follow 
this recommendation of the White Paper and both develop ethics codes covering independence and 
also implement effective compliance systems. Important to achieving the Board’s objectives is a need 
focus on ethical behavior throughout a firm and not just avoidance of a list of hackneyed conditions 
that supposedly impair independence.
In terms of the matters upon which specific comment was requested.
1) No, there is doubt that the proposed Recommendation will accomplish this objective in a 
meaningful fashion.
2) Yes, as stated above, a focus on communicating how a firm achieved the required behavioral 
objectives would be more effective.
3) No, the proposal could set back achievement of the Board’s longer-term important goal of 
developing a comprehensive framework for auditor independence.
4) No, this would stereotype the requirement into a prediction that would not be responsive to the 
requirements of generally accepted auditing standards.
5) Yes, if made, any recommendation should be made jointly for the reasons stated in the invitation
Yours very truly, 
TOTAL P.02











Jersey City NJ 07302 
Telephone (201) 521 3000 
Facsimile (201) 521 3333
Direct phone (201) 521 3048 
Direct fax (201) 521 4444
From:
Return fax number:
Kenneth E. Dakdduk 
(201) 521 4444
Date:




If this fax is incomplete or illegible please telephone (201) 321 3044
This facsimile transmission is intended for the addressee indicated above. It may contain information that is privileged, confidential, or 
otherwise protected from disclosure. Any review, dissemination, or use of this transmission or its contents by persons other than the 
addressee is strictly prohibited. If you have received this transmission in error, please notify us immediately by telephone, and mail the 
original to us at the above address.
Message:
Attached is our response to Invitation to Comment 98-1





Jersey City NJ 07302 
Telephone (201) 521 3000 
Facsimile (201) 521 3333
Mr. Arthur Siegel, Executive Director 
Independence Standards Board 
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor 
New York, New York 10036-8775 
Attn: ITC 98-1
Dear Mr. Siegel:
PricewaterhouseCoopers is pleased to respond to the Independence Standards Board’s 
Invitation to Comment (ITC) 98-1, Proposed Recommendation to the Executive 
Committee of the SEC Practice Section of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants. We are pleased that the Board shares our belief that communications 
between auditors and audit committees is an important means of ensuring an effective 
audit, and we applaud you for your confidence in the profession’s self-regulatory process.
In 1994, the Public Oversight Board’s Advisory Panel on Auditor Independence (the 
“Kirk Panel”) released its report titled, Strengthening the Professionalism of the 
Independent Auditor. That report contained a number of recommendations regarding 
auditor communications with audit committees and boards of directors. We embraced the 
Kirk Panel’s recommendations, and we have found that the overwhelming majority of 
audit committees welcome the discussions regarding the company’s accounting policies 
and significant estimates, encourage us to be forthright in our discussions with them, and 
would discourage any efforts by their management to inhibit us in our audit work. We 
believe audit committees also would embrace communications by auditors about 
independence.
As noted in ITC 98-1, confirmation of an auditor’s independence is presently conveyed by 
the issuance of the auditor’s report. An auditor’s report confirms the auditor’s 
independence not only as of the date the report is issued but at all times during the period 
of the professional engagement. Audit committees appear to understand the significant 
message conveyed each year by the auditor’s report regarding independence, i.e., unless 
we notify them to the contrary, we are in compliance with all applicable independence 
requirements at all times. Therefore, it is not certain that the proposed requirement will 
heighten the awareness of audit committees regarding independence matters or increase 
(or result in) discussions between the auditor and the audit committee about auditor
PriceWaterhouseCooPERS  
independence when the auditor’s independence is not impaired. Nevertheless, we support 
the proposed recommendation. If adopted, however, we recommend that the requirement 
be reviewed a year or two after its effective date to determine whether it has in fact 
improved auditor/audit committee communications on independence matters.
Our views regarding some of the other issues raised in ITC 98-1 follow.
• If the proposed requirement was to be adopted by the Auditing Standards Board 
(ASB) as a generally accepted auditing standard, it would apply not only to auditors 
who are not members of the SECPS, but also to auditors who audit nonpublic 
companies. We do not believe the benefits of the proposed requirement are 
sufficiently certain to justify its application to auditors of nonpublic companies. 
Accordingly, we believe that the proposed requirement should not be referred to the 
ASB
• Since the purpose of the confirmation is to stimulate discussion between the auditor 
and the audit committee about independence, the auditor should be permitted to 
deliver the confirmation at the time such discussion would be most likely to occur. 
Accordingly, the recommendation should continue to permit flexibility in the timing of 
the auditor’s confirmation Additionally, the recommendation should clearly state that 
the confirmation may be included in the same communication that includes other 
SECPS-required communications to the audit committee (i.e., description of and fees 
paid for non-audit services), and that this communication is not required to be written.
We would be pleased to discuss our comments with you. Please contact Robert H. Herz 











Attached please find Deloitte & Touche LLRs letter of comment on ITC 98-1.
The original of this letter will be sent via: Federal Express for delivery Wednesday, August 5th.
Thank you.
From: Office:
Trevor J. Barton N.O. Wilton
Fax Number: Number of Pages (including this one):
203-761-3023______________________ 5_______________________________________
Date: To confirm receipt, or if you do not receive all pages, please call:
08/04/98 203-761-3632 or Brenda @ 203-761-3172
Confidentiality Notice: This page and any accompanying documents contain confidential information intended for a specific individual 
and purpose. This telecopied information is private and protected by law. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that 
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1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
Attn: ITC 98-1
Re: Invitation To Comment 98-1: Proposed Recommendation to the Executive 
Committee of the SEC Practice Section of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants - Confirmation of Auditor Independence
Dear Mr. Siegal:
Enclosed is our letter of comment on the Independence Standards Board’s Invitation to 
Comment 98-1, Proposed Recommendation to the Executive Committee of the SEC Practice 
Section of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, dated May 29, 1998.
If you have any questions concerning our comments, please contact Robert J. Kneppers at 

















1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
Attn: ITC 98-1
Re: Invitation To Comment 98-1: Proposed Recommendation to the Executive 
Committee of the SEC Practice Section of the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants - Confirmation of Auditor Independence
Dear Mr. Siegel:
We are pleased to comment on Invitation To Comment 98-1, Proposed Recommendation to 
the Executive Committee of the SEC Practice Section of the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants, (ITC 98-1). Such proposal would require member firms to confirm their 
independence annually to each public company client’s audit committee or board of directors.
General Views
We support the Independence Standards Board’s (the “Board”) initiative to enhance 
communication between audit committees and auditors regarding issues of auditor 
independence. We further agree that such communication may assist directors in improving 
their understanding of independence issues and exercising their corporate governance 
responsibilities.
Paragraphs 8 and 9 of ITC 98-1 discuss the proposed timing of the issuance of the auditor’s 
independence confirmation. Paragraph 8 specifies that the Board believes it would be 
beneficial to have the independence confirmation delivered by the auditor at the beginning of 
the audit. However, paragraph 9 acknowledges the need for flexibility in the timing of 
delivery of the independence confirmation and states that . the confirmation could be 





While we agree that it would be beneficial for this communication to take place early in the 
audit process, we also concur with the need for flexibility in the timing and nature of the 
independence confinnation, thereby not placing any undue burden on either the registrant or 
the audit firm. Factors we believe support the need for flexibility include: (i) registrants may 
have different schedules for the timing of audit committee or board meetings; (ii) audit firms 
generally tailor the timing and procedures for each audit engagement to the specific client; and 
(iii) audit committees of smaller companies often do not observe as rigid a schedule as do 
larger companies in connection with the audit. We also believe that the audit committee or 
board of directors should be free to determine the point in the audit process that would be most 
appropriate to receive their auditor’s independence confirmation. Further, flexibility would 
minimize incremental cost because the recommended language could be incorporated into an 
existing report or communication, obviating the need for a separate report.
If the Board determines to go forward with its recommendation, we believe the Board’s 
recommendation to the SEC Practice Section should be worded broadly. The Executive 
Committee of the SEC Practice Section is in the best position to determine the specifics of any 
change to its membership requirements.
Responses to Questions
In addition to the comments discussed under General Views above, we would like to provide 
the following comments with respect to specific questions posed by the Board.
Question 1 - Will the proposed Recommendation be helpful in fostering additional attention 
on independence issues by audit committees and their auditors?
Response - We agree with the Board’s belief that communication of an auditor’s independence 
to the audit committee in the form of a confirmation or its equivalent would be helpful in 
fostering additional attention on independence issues.
Question 2-Is there a more or equally effective mechanism for promoting audit committee 
evaluation of the independence of the entity's auditors?
Response - We believe that Question 2, as worded, is inconsistent with several points made 
elsewhere in ITC 98-1. First, the objective of the proposal as stated in paragraph 1 is to
. improve directors’ understanding of independence issues. - rather than requiring 




audit committee’s conclusion on the auditor’s independence would necessarily be based, in 
large part, solely on the representations of the auditor...”
We firmly believe that the auditor’s confirmation should not be construed as an evaluation tool 
to be used by the audit committee to determine the firm’s independence. Even if the audit 
committee was knowledgeable with respect to all aspects of auditor independence, it could not 
have the specific information that would be necessary to evaluate the independence of the 
auditor. We believe the responsibility for monitoring and evaluating independence 
appropriately rests with the auditing firm and engagement personnel, as they are the only ones 
who are in a position to reach conclusions concerning the independence of the firm.
We believe that the Board’s recommendation should emphasize that the primary responsibility 
for evaluating and determining independence rests with the auditing firm. However, once the 
firm has made that determination, it would be beneficial to encourage discussion about the 
firm’s conclusion with the audit committee.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Board’s intent in posing Question 2 appears to be the 
solicitation of input as to other means of achieving the objective set forth in paragraph 1. We 
believe that the proposal is the most expedient and effective means of achieving the stated 
objective and we have no specific alternatives to recommend.
Question 3-Do the benefits of the proposed requirement outweigh its costs?
Response - We believe the benefits of a more heightened awareness of independence would 
outweigh any incremental costs associated with the issuance of the proposed auditor’s 
confirmation. Further, any incremental costs associated with issuing such a communication 
would not be expected to be significant as firms presently “confirm” their independence in 
connection with the issuance of their auditors’ report and letters to underwriters.
Question 4 — While the recommendation encourages independence discussion with the audit 
committee early in the audit process so that any concerns of the audit committee can be 
addressed before the audit is fully underway, the Recommendation is drafted to allow 
flexibility in the timing of confirmation delivery. Would it be desirable to recommend that the 
independence confirmation be delivered at the time that the auditor is appointed for the 
upcoming audit?
Response - We believe it would be desirable for the auditor’s independence to be confirmed 




Views above, we also believe it would be appropriate to allow for flexibility regarding the 
timing of the independence confirmation.
Question 5—A smaller number of auditors of U.S. public companies, as well as auditors of 
foreign companies registered with the SEC, are not members of the SECPS. Therefore, if the 
Recommendation became an SECPS membership requirement, rather than a requirement 
under U.S generally accepted auditing standards, it would not apply to all audits of 
companies subject to SEC reporting requirements. Should the Recommendation be submitted 
to the Auditing Standards Board (ASB), as opposed to the SECPS, so that the requirement 
would apply to all audits of public companies? (It should be noted that there are existing 
SECPS requirements that apply only to member firms, such as those mentioned in paragraph 
9 of the attached proposal.) Or should the proposal be a dual recommendation to both the 
SECPS and the ASB, because the SECPS Executive Committee can implement it immediately, 
while the ASB's process would require a significantly longer period of time?
Response - We believe that this recommendation should be made to the SECPS for inclusion 
in its membership requirements. If adopted by the SECPS it would then become part of a 
broader set of requirements pertaining to SECPS members that are subject to testing in peer 
review. We also believe the Board’s recommendation to the SECPS should be forwarded to 
the ASB with a recommendation that the ASB consider the establishment of a similar 
requirement in generally accepted auditing standards.
*****
If you have any questions concerning our comments, please contact Robert J. Kueppers at 
(203) 761-3579 or Richard M. Goligoski at (203) 761-3423.
Yours truly,
WRDR WERMER, ROGERS, DORAN & RUZON CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
EMCO PLAZA BLDG., SUITE 202, 57 NORTH OTTAWA STREET, JOUET, ILLINOIS 60432-1369 • 815/722-6693 • FAX 815/722-4263
Mr. Dennis Spackman
C/o Church of Jesus Christ
Of the Latter-Day Saints 
15th Floor
50 East North Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84150-3643
July 8, 1998
Dear Dennis:
Enclosed is my memorandum on the proposed recommendation of the 
Independence Standard Board (ISB) to the SEC practice section.
Furthermore, I have reviewed the Exposure Draft on the Omnibus Proposal 
of the Professional Ethics Division and I have no comment. I believe this 
proposal should be adopted, but that later revisions based on experience are 
likely.
Finally, I find myself in accordance with Commissioner Norman Johnson's 
comments. Clearly the new standard blurs the line as to the authority of the 
SEC to set the bond of 'improper processional conduct'. While I did not 
comment on the proposal of the SEC, I would agree that the SEC may be 
overreaching. Hopefully, the AICPA will undertake the problem of response.
Sincerely,
WERMER, ROGERS, DORAN & RUZON
John R. Rogers, 
Partner
JRR:mas
Members of American institute of Certified Public Accountants/Illinois CPA Society
WERMER. ROGERS. DORAN & RUZON CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
EMCO PLAZA BLDG., SUITE 202, 57 NORTH OTTAWA STREET, JOUET, ILLINOIS 60432-1369 • 815/722-6693 • FAX 815/722-4263
MEMORANDUM
Input on 'ISB Invitation To Comment' ITC-98-1.
A review of the specific questions indicates to me the following responses:
1. The recommendation, when implemented by the action of the 
auditors, (i.e. the letter required to be sent to the audit 
committee) should highlight and emphasize the importance of the 
independence issue, especially so if the letter delineates 
consulting engagements not considered harmful or germane to 
'independence'.
2. The audit committee must rely on the integrity of the auditor's 
letters. No other method is as simple. If an auditor overstates 
the case for independence, the letter serves as record of much 
overstatement.
3. Since the principle of independence requires the audit firm to be 
aware of a question of the lack thereof, the letter should be a 
mere recording of data required to be kept.
4. The time for the independence confirmation must be at the 
inception of the engagement. Any later reporting could give rise 
to wasted audit fees, legal entanglement and/or controversy.
The audit committee of the subject corporation must be fully aware 
at the commencement, not later.
5. Since the recommendation should be inclusive of all auditors of 
U.S. public companies and all companies registered with the S.E.C. 
the recommendation should be submitted to (and approved by) SECPS 
and the ASB.
Further Discussion:
The proposal suggests that audit committee should not be expected to 
understand the specific and complex rules pertaining to independence. This 
'begs the question'. The independence of the auditor is of primary concern to 
the audit committee. The letters should provide more than flat statement 
(somewhat self-serving) by the auditor that the firm is independent.
Consideration should be given to including in the letter (and attachments) a 
statement as to how the non-stock ownership query to firm members is 
implemented as well as a brief synopsis of major consulting contracts in the 
last year as well as on-going contracts.









Certified Management Accountant Program 
Certified in Financial Management Program
Arthur Siegel, CPA
Executive Director
The Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of Americas, 6th floor
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Mr. Siegel,
Your letter to IMA’s President Keith Bryant has been referred to our committees, the Committee on 
Professional Issues and the Ethics Committee, for a response. We are pleased to comment to the 
Independence Standards Board (ISB) on its Invitation to Comment (ITC 98-1), “Proposed 
Recommendation to the Executive Committee of the SEC Practice Section of the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants” (the Recommendation).
Overall, we believe the proposal should not be adopted, at least in its present form. However, we are 
very much in agreement with the Board's objective to increase meaningful dialog between the auditors 
and the audit committees. Our reasoning follows:
• It is unwise to place additional focus on the current highly technical and complex ethics rules. This 
additional focus may delay the achievement of the ISB’s goal of developing a new conceptual 
framework for auditor independence. In our view, that goal should be the foremost objective, and 
only after that is achieved, should there be reconsideration of how to implement its provisions.
• A standard confirmation would be redundant. More valuable would be a communication at the end 
of the audit of how a firm did comply with the independence requirement to “be independent in fact 
and appearance when providing auditing and other attestation services” as stated in the AICPA Code 
of Professional Conduct, Article IV.
• A standard confirmation is likely to be a stereotyped routine communication that may not improve 
directors’ understanding of independence issues.
• Without substantial amplification, the SECPS peer review program would be unable to effectively 
test compliance with existing independence rules, such as measuring the success of a firms’ systems 
designed to achieve the stated behavioral objectives. Current quality control standards relating to 
independence are inadequate for this purpose.
In terms of the matters upon which specific comment was requested:
1) Will the proposed Recommendation be helpful in fostering additional attention on independence 
issues by audit committees and their auditors?
No, we believe there is considerable doubt that the proposed Recommendation will accomplish this 
objective in a meaningful fashion.
The Independence Standards Board 
July 31, 1998
Page 2
2) Is there a more or equally effective mechanism for promoting audit committee evaluation of the 
independence of the entity’s auditors?
Yes, as stated above, a focus on communicating how the firm achieved the required behavior 
objectives would be more effective. Further, if the Board’s primary objective is to promote audit 
committee evaluation of independence, this factor should be set forth more prominently.
3) Do the benefits of the proposed requirement outweigh its costs?
No, but we believe the proposal could set back achievement of the Board’s longer-term goals of 
developing a comprehensive framework for auditor independence.
4) While the Recommendation encourages independence discussions with the audit committee early in 
the audit process so that any concerns of the audit committee can be addressed before the audit is 
fully underway, the Recommendation is drafted to allow flexibility in the timing of confirmation 
delivery. Would it be desirable to recommend that the independence confirmation be delivered at the 
time that the auditor is appointed for the upcoming audit?
No, this would make the requirement a sterotype, a predictable promise that would not be responsive 
to generally accepted auditing standards.
5) A small number of auditors of U.S. public companies, as well as auditors of foreign companies 
registered with the SEC. are not members of SECPS. Therefore, if the Recommendation became an 
SECPS membership requirement, rather than a requirement under U.S. generally accepted auditing 
standards, it would not apply to all audits of companies subject to SEC reporting requirements. 
Should the Recommendation be submitted to the Auditing Standards Board (ASB), as opposed to 
SECPS, so that the requirement would apply to all audits of public companies? (It should be noted 
that there are existing SECPS requirements that apply only to member firms, such as those 
mentioned in paragraph 9 of the attached proposal.) Or should the proposal be a dual 
recommendation to both the SECPS and the ASB. because the SECPS Executive Committee can 
implement it immediately, while the ASB's processes would require a significantly longer period of 
time?
Yes, the Recommendation should be made jointly for the reasons stated.
We would be pleased to discuss our comments with you at your convenience.
Sincerely,
L. Hal Rogero, Jr., CPA 
Chair, Committee on Professional Issues
cc: Hayward Bell, CMA - Chair, Ethics Committee
John J. Perrell, III, CPA - Chair, Financial Reporting Committee
Public Oversight Board
One Station Place (203) 3S3 S300
Stamford, CT 06902 Fax (203) 353-5311
For Reference 
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Chairman
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Independence Standards Board 
American Institute of CPAs 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York NY 10036-8775
Dear Art;
STAFF




JOHN F. CULLEN 
Assistant Technical Director
ALAN H. FELDMAN 
Assistant Technical Director
I believe it to be useful to respond more fully to your observation that the POB’s suggestion to 
expand ITC 98-1 recommended communication to audit committees, to include the 
description and amount of all non-audit services provided by the audit and its affiliates, is the 
same as the SECPS membership requirement.
I think the POB recommendation would frame the existing SECPS communication in a way 
that would focus directors on why the disclosure is being made. That is, that directors should 
evaluate whether the non-audit services might affect the auditor's independence or appearance 
of independence. The purpose of the existing disclosure is not understood by many directors. 
Further, some board of directors do not permit their auditors to provide non-audit services 
because of a misguided concern that auditor independence might be affected by “management 
consulting services,”
The disclosure the POB is recommending would not only disclose the nature and amount of 
non-audit services, but could also explain that they do not violate the independence 
requirements of the SEC and the profession because the services do not (a) result in the 
auditor assuming a managerial responsibility and (b) result in the auditor making decisions for 
the client, assuming custodianship of assets, maintaining books and records or providing a 
service that is otherwise proscribed.
I am confident that the expanded disclosure recommended by the POB could be made in a 
way that directors would better understand what they should be aware of from an 
independence perspective. That type of disclosure would likely not only be beneficial to 
directors, but would also benefit auditors, by helping to eliminate the concerns some directors 
have about the independence implications of non-audit services.
Sincerely,
The Public Oversight Board is an independent, private sector body that monitors and
reports on the self-regulatory programs and activities of the SEC Practice Section of the
Division of CPA Firms of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
 POB Public Oversight BoardOne Station Place (203) 353-5300
Stamford, CT 06902 Fax (203) 353-5311
August 10, 1998
Independence Standards Board 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 




Gentlemen:CHARLES A. BOWSHER ROBERT F. FROEHLKE DONALD J. KIRKSTAFF
The Public Oversight Board (POB) is pleased to respond to the Independence Standards Board 
(ISB) invitation to comment on its proposed recommendation to the Executive Committee of 
the SECPS of the AICPA (ITC 98-1, May 29, 1998).JERRY D. SULLIVAN
Executive DirectorCHARLES J. EVERS
Technical DirectorJOHN F. CULLEN
Assistant Technical DirectorALAN H. FELDMAN
Assistant Technical Director
The ISB recommendation calls for member firms of the SECPS to confirm their independence 
annually to each public company client’s audit committee or board of directors with the 
objective of initiating dialogue that would improve the directors’ understanding of 
independence issues, thereby assisting them in exercising their corporate governance 
responsibilities.
The POB applauds efforts to improve the understanding of audit committees and board of 
directors about corporate governance issues related to the quality of financial reporting and 
strongly endorses efforts that focus directors on the fact that they are the independent auditor’s 
client and they carry a fiduciary responsibility to protect shareholder’s interests. (See 
Strengthening the Professionalism of the Independent Auditor, Report to the Public Oversight 
Board of the SEC Practice Section, AICPA from the Advisory Panel on Auditor 
Independence.)
However, the POB believes that the ISB’s proposed recommendation needs to be expanded to 
attain its stated objective. Auditor independence is an elusive concept. Independence 
requirements of the AICPA and the SEC are a large body of published rules and 
interpretations that largely deal with situations directed at avoiding auditor-client relationships 
that create a financial relationship or other conflict of interests that would impair the reality of 
independence or create the appearance of a lack of independence. While client audit 
committees expect, and largely take for granted, their auditor’s independence, they have little 
understanding in the abstract notions of independence and the disjointed myriad of published 
rules that auditors must either adhere or analogize to in assessing their independence in a 
specific client situation. They need more than a simple declaration to stimulate a meaningful 
discussion of auditor independence.
To meet its objective, the proposed recommendation should be expanded to require auditors to 
communicate to audit committees specific matters relating to the client-auditor relationship 
that the auditors and directors should be aware of, and evaluate, when reaching a conclusion 
that the auditor’s objectivity with regard to the audit of the client’s financial statements has not 
been impaired or that the relationship does not create the appearance of a conflict of interest. 
This communication therefore should include: (a) the description and the dollar amount of all
POB
The Public Oversight Board is an independent, private sector body that monitors and
reports on the self-regulatory programs and activities of the SEC Practice Section of the
Division for CPA Firms of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
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non-audit services provided or agreed to be provided to the client by the auditor or its 
affiliates, (b) an explanation and the dollar value of all financial relationships between the 
auditor, its affiliates, and the client, such as joint ventures, marketing arrangements, and 
investments, and (c) any other significant matters relating to the client relationship that the 
auditor considered when reaching a conclusion about its independence.
The POB believes that a forthright explanation and discussion of the independence 
implications of the above matters in a required communication to directors will likely 
stimulate a meaningful discussion about the client-auditor relationship that will not only 
engage directors, but also will enhance auditor professionalism. Finally, the POB believes 
that the public interest would be served by a broader communication resulting in directors 
having a better understanding and assessment of all significant aspects of the client-auditor 
relationship that might affect the auditor’s independence.
We will be pleased to further elaborate on our recommendations at your convenience.
cc: Michael A. Conway, SECPS Chair 
Lynn Turner, SEC Chief Accountant
AICPA
August 26, 1998
To: Members of the Independence Standards Board
The AICPA’s Professional Ethics Executive Committee (PEEC) submits this comment letter in 
response to the Board’s Invitation to Comment on the proposal that the Board recommend to the 
Executive Committee of the AICPA’s SEC Practice Section (SECPS) that it require member 
firms to annually confirm in writing their independence to each public company client’s audit 
committee or board of directors and to offer to meet with the committee or board to further 
discuss independence.
Our comments will relate first to the five questions posed in the Invitation to Comment.
1. The proposed recommendation is a small step that may be helpful in focusing audit 
committees’ and directors’ attention on issues of auditor independence.
2. The recommendation will not promote “evaluation” of the independence of an entity’s 
auditors for the reasons cited in paragraph 7 of the Discussion portion of the Invitation to 
Comment. To evaluate is to determine. We agree with the assessment in paragraph 7 that 
insufficient knowledge and impossibility of confirmation of auditor representations by 
the audit committee and directors would preclude their evaluation of auditor 
independence. We do agree, however, that the proposal will contribute to the overall 
awareness, understanding and discussion of independence issues by audit committees, 
directors and auditors.
3. The benefits of the recommendation outweigh the costs.
4. We support the recommendation as drafted; i.e. to allow flexibility in the timing of 
delivery of the independence confirmation. The auditor - client relationship is the best 
determinant of the appropriate delivery time. Should this recommendation be adopted 
audit clients will, together with their auditors, know best when confirmation is 
appropriate.
5. A majority of PEEC members oppose the referral of the recommendation to the Auditing 
Standards Board (ASB). Should the ASB adopt the recommendation and issue it as a 
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) it would not only subject the “small number” of 
auditors of public companies who are not SECPS members to the SAS but also the large 
number of auditors of non-public companies. To many of those auditors the SAS would 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Harborside financial Center, 201 Plaza Three, Jersey City, NJ 07311-3881 (201) 938-3000 • (212) 318-0500 • fax (201) 938-3329
The Never Underestimate The Value.SM
not be either cost effective or practical. Further, many non-public clients do not have 
audit committees or equivalent oversight. Should the ISB propose and the SECPS adopt 
this recommendation, the SEC through regulation or persuasion may seek to require it of 
auditors of public companies who are not SECPS members. Alternatively, to the extent 
public companies perceive value in this recommendation auditors who are not SECPS 
members might be persuaded by their clients to adopt the recommendation. In any event, 
issuance of a SAS causing the recommendation to be part of a GAAS audit would be 
counterproductive.
The PEEC offers this additional comment with respect to paragraphs 4 and 10 in the Discussion 
part of the Invitation to Comment and the wording of the Recommendation of Confirmation 
Language.
1. The word “report” in the fifth line should be deleted and replaced with the word “letter”. 
SAS 72, is titled: “Letters for Underwriters” and throughout uses the word “letter”. 
Paragraph 6 of the Invitation to Comment includes the word “letter”. A “report” has a 
technical connotation which may not be appropriate in the context of the 
recommendation.
2. The sixth line contains the phrase “under the applicable rules”. Because the applicable 
rules are stated a few lines below this phrase, the phrase is unnecessary. We suggest the 
first sentence of the confirmation language end with the word “independence”.
3. The ninth line refers to “independent accountants”. We suggest that be changed to 
“independent certified public accountants” as stated in SAS 72.
4. The tenth line includes the phrase “under the published requirements” of the SEC, etc. 
We recommend that phrase be deleted and replaced with the following: “within the 
meaning of: the applicable Securities Act, the published regulations and interpretations 
promulgated thereunder, the pronouncements of the Independence Standards Board and 
Rule 101 of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants’ Code of Professional 
Conduct, its interpretations and rulings”.
The phrase “within the meaning” is key: it is used in SAS 72; and it allows for discussion 
and explanation which is the objective of the ISB’s recommendation.
Finally, with respect to the ISB proposal overall we note that neither Generally Accepted 
Auditing Standards nor SECPS rules require communications to audit committees or boards to 
be only in writing; accordingly, the PEEC recommends that the proposal be revised to not 
require only written communications regarding auditor independence.
The PEEC appreciates this opportunity to comment. I would be pleased to discuss the comments 
and other matters with respect to the ISB’s Invitation to Comment.
Sincerely,
Frank J. Pearlman
Chair, Professional Ethics Executive Committee
FJP:bjb







To: Members of the Independence Standards Board
The AICPA’s Professional Ethics Executive Committee (PEEC) submits this comment letter in 
response to the Board’s Invitation to Comment on the proposal that the Board recommend to the 
Executive Committee of the AICPA’s SEC Practice Section (SECPS) that it require member 
firms to annually confirm in writing their independence to each public company client’s audit 
committee or board of directors and to offer to meet with the committee or board to further 
discuss independence.
Our comments will relate first to the five questions posed in the Invitation to Comment.
1. The proposed recommendation is a small step that may be helpful in focusing audit 
committees’ and directors’ attention on issues of auditor independence.
2. The recommendation will not promote “evaluation” of the independence of an entity’s 
auditors for the reasons cited in paragraph 7 of the Discussion portion of the Invitation to 
Comment. To evaluate is to determine. We agree with the assessment in paragraph 7 that 
insufficient knowledge and impossibility of confirmation of auditor representations by 
the audit committee and directors would preclude their evaluation of auditor 
independence. We do agree, however, that the proposal will contribute to the overall 
awareness, understanding and discussion of independence issues by audit committees, 
directors and auditors.
3. The benefits of the recommendation outweigh the costs.
4. We support the recommendation as drafted; i.e. to allow flexibility in the timing of 
delivery of the independence confirmation. The auditor - client relationship is the best 
determinant of the appropriate delivery time. Should this recommendation be adopted 
audit clients will, together with their auditors, know best when confirmation is 
appropriate.
5. A majority of PEEC members oppose the referral of the recommendation to the Auditing 
Standards Board (ASB). Should the ASB adopt the recommendation and issue it as a 
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) it would not only subject the “small number” of 
auditors of public companies who are not SECPS members to the SAS but also the large 
number of auditors of non-public companies. To many of those auditors the SAS would 
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not be either cost effective or practical. Further, many non-public clients do not have 
audit committees or equivalent oversight. Should the ISB propose and the SECPS adopt 
this recommendation, the SEC through regulation or persuasion may seek to require it of 
auditors of public companies who are not SECPS members. Alternatively, to the extent 
public companies perceive value in this recommendation auditors who are not SECPS 
members might be persuaded by their clients to adopt the recommendation. In any event, 
issuance of a SAS causing the recommendation to be part of a GAAS audit would be 
counterproductive.
The PEEC offers this additional comment with respect to paragraphs 4 and 10 in the Discussion 
part of the Invitation to Comment and the wording of the Recommendation of Confirmation 
Language.
1. The word “report” in the fifth line should be deleted and replaced with the word “letter”. 
SAS 72, is titled: “Letters for Underwriters” and throughout uses the word “letter”. 
Paragraph 6 of the Invitation to Comment includes the word “letter”. A “report” has a 
technical connotation which may not be appropriate in the context of the 
recommendation.
2. The sixth line contains the phrase “under the applicable rules”. Because the applicable 
rules are stated a few lines below this phrase, the phrase is unnecessary. We suggest the 
first sentence of the confirmation language end with the word “independence”.
3. The ninth line refers to “independent accountants”. We suggest that be changed to 
“independent certified public accountants” as stated in SAS 72.
4. The tenth line includes the phrase “under the published requirements” of the SEC, etc. 
We recommend that phrase be deleted and replaced with the following: “within the 
meaning of: the applicable Securities Act, the published regulations and interpretations 
promulgated thereunder, the pronouncements of the Independence Standards Board and 
Rule 101 of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants’ Code of Professional 
Conduct, its interpretations and rulings”.
The phrase “within the meaning” is key: it is used in SAS 72; and it allows for discussion 
and explanation which is the objective of the ISB’s recommendation.
Finally, with respect to the ISB proposal overall we note that neither Generally Accepted 
Auditing Standards nor SECPS rules require communications to audit committees or boards to 
be only in writing; accordingly, the PEEC recommends that the proposal be revised to not 
require only written communications regarding auditor independence.
The PEEC appreciates this opportunity to comment. I would be pleased to discuss the comments 
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549
For Reference 
Do Not Take 
From the Library
August 21, 1998
Mr. William T. Allen, Chairman 
Independence Standards Board 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036-8775
Dear Chairman Allen:
The efforts of the Independence Standards Board (“ISB”) to improve upon the 
protection provided to investors when an auditor engages in timely and thorough 
communications with the audit committee of an audit client are important to the 
Commission. As you may know, the Commission has endorsed the establishment by all 
publicly held companies of audit committees composed of outside directors. It also has 
urged the business and financial communities and all shareholders of publicly held 
companies to lend their full and continuing support to implement recommendations to 
enhance the abilities of audit committees. The Commission’s support is intended to afford 
the greatest possible protection to investors who rely upon the financial statements of 
public companies.1 Most recently, reflecting the Commission’s long standing support, 
Chairman Levitt has stressed the importance of audit committees and their responsibility 
to question the auditing professionals.2
1 Accounting Series Release (“ASR”) No. 123 (March 23. 1972).
2 Arthur Levitt. The SEC Looks At Governance, The Corporate Board. July/August 1998, at 4.
On a personal note, I have had extensive experience with audit committees as a 
partner with a big five firm and as a Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”). It is my personal 
experience that the company and shareholders gain tremendous value when the audit 
committee works closely with the auditors and the CFO. As an audit partner, I worked to 
keep the audit committee reasonably informed of the various services performed by the 
accounting firm through an in-depth discussion of the purposes and ramifications of the 
various services. It is only through these in-depth discussions that an audit committee can 
understand the auditor’s assertions about its independence and make the committee’s own 
reasonably informed decisions regarding the auditor’s independence.
The staff of the SEC recognizes the importance of auditors confirming their 
independence annually to each public audit client’s audit committee or board of directors. 
The staff has encountered numerous occasions where auditor independence problems have 
delayed the ability of a company to comply with the requirement to file with the 
Commission financial statements audited by an independent auditor. These problems 
usually arise in connection with the company’s registration of securities for sale. In nearly 
every instance, the company’s management, audit committee and board of directors were 
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not aware of the particular auditor independence problems until those issues were raised 
by the staff. In many cases, these independence problems have prevented a public 
company filing from going effective on the date desired by its management thus preventing 
the company from the scheduled selling of its securities in the public markets. In some 
cases, registrants were even required to have a new audit performed by a different audit 
firm before a filing could go effective.
Based on these experiences, a mere confirmation of independence by an auditor is 
insufficient. In each of the aforementioned cases the auditors had presented their public 
company audit client with a report from an independent auditor. However, in these same 
cases, it was not until the SEC staff raised the question of independence that the 
management (and hopefully the audit committee and board of directors) became aware of 
the independence issue. Unfortunately, it is not the auditor, but the corporation and its 
shareholders that suffer when it is determined, at this late date, that an auditor lacked 
independence.
As noted by Chairman Levitt, directors are in an ideal position to monitor new 
developments and to address problems earlier, rather than after serious injury to the 
corporation has occurred.3 As the Chairman stated, we must have a system that gives 
directors timely information, to help them represent shareholders. *4 The proposal that the 
auditors represent to the audit committee that they are independent at the time that the 
auditor is appointed is the first step to a system that gives directors information timely. 
However, an auditor’s representation of independence is meaningless unless it is 
accompanied by a robust written discussion that provides the committee with the full 
range of facts and ability to become reasonably informed about the relationships with the 
auditor. With this approach, the audit committee is in the best position to make 
reasonable inquiries and protect the corporation and shareholders against the cost that can 
result when auditors are found to lack independence.
1 Id. at 5.
4 Id.
5 A Special Report by the Public Oversight Board, p. 50 (March 5. 1993).
Strengthening the Professionalism of the Independent Auditor, Report to the Public Oversight Board of 
the SEC Practice Section, AICPA from the Advisory Panel on Auditor Independence (the "Kirk" panel), 
pp. 14-15 (September 13, 1994) (citing Improving Audit Committee Performance: What Works Best. p. 2 
(1993)).
7 Id. at 15.
These observations are consistent with those of others overseeing the profession. 
The Public Oversight Board (“POB”) has stated that, “in too many instances the audit 
committees do not perform their duties adequately and in many cases do not understand 
their responsibilities.”5 Consequently, as noted in the report prepared by the “Kirk panel,” 
audit committee members must be provided with more background and training to enable 
them to be more effective.6 The Kirk panel recommended that responsibility should be 
placed on the independent auditor to be more forthcoming in communicating with the 
audit committee.7 The Kirk panel also noted that the Board should expect the auditor to 
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assist it in discharging [its] responsibility to the shareholders, and the auditor should 
assume the obligation to do so.8
The POB, in its response to the ISB’s invitation to comment, has recommended 
that the annual confirmation of an auditor’s independence be enhanced to include 
information to enable the audit committee to make fully informed decisions about an 
auditor’s independence. The staff of the SEC fully supports the POB’s recommendations. 
In order to be effective, an annual representation of independence to an audit client should 
be accompanied by a discussion in writing of situations and/or services that might raise 
independence problems as well as the potential impact on the registrant should the 
situation and/or service cause an impairment of the audit firm’s independence. This would 
prevent an auditor’s annual confirmation of independence from becoming merely a form 
letter.
The staff also concurs with the POB that the ISB’s guidance for auditors should 
surpass the guidance set forth by the SEC Practice Section (“SECPS”) for its members. 
The SECPS guidance requires members to:
Report annually to the audit committee or board of directors of each SEC audit client 
on the total fees received from the client for management advisory services during the 
year under audit and a description of the types of such services rendered. (SECPS 
Reference Manual § 1000.08).
The guidance provided in response to the ISB’s recommendation (or any guidance 
provided directly by the ISB) should be much broader and should be required to be in 
writing. It should serve to educate the audit committee about issues involved in a 
determination of the auditor’s independence. For instance, the guidance could require the 
auditor to advise the audit committee that:
• Professional standards require auditors to avoid situations that may lead outsiders 
to doubt their independence.9
• There are broad underlying guidelines to analyze whether an auditor can be lacking 
in independence such as when the audit firm is placed in the position of auditing its 
own work; the auditor is perceived as making decisions for the audit client; or the 
auditor is perceived as management or an employee of the audit client.
• There are other specific restrictions on auditors in areas such as financial interests, 
family relationships, employment of audit firm personnel, and acting in the capacity 
of an attorney, broker/dealer, or commercial competitor.
8 Id. at 16.
9 Statements on Auditing Standards No. 1. AU § 220.03.
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Finally, the guidance could require a discussion of the potential independence issues 
involved with each of the services referred to in the SECPS requirement.
The ISB is to be commended for its efforts to provide a process through which 
auditors and audit committees can focus on independence issues. This effort is consistent 
with the ISB’s leadership role as the authoritative body10 established to develop guidance 
with respect to independence for auditors of public companies. However, given that the 
ISB has been recognized as the authoritative body to provide guidance on issues of 
independence for auditors of public companies, a more affirmative demonstration of this 
authority would be to institute its own requirement for auditors of public companies rather 
than suggest to another group that it do so. This would permit the ISB to provide precise 
instruction to auditors that would emphasize the importance of independence to auditors 
and audit committees rather than relegate this responsibility to another standard setting 
body that lacks the mandate to promulgate independence guidance.
The staff's response to the specific numbered items posed by the Invitation to 
Comment follows.
Recommendation/Response:
1) The recommendation should be revised to incorporate the suggestions noted 
above.
2) The recommendation should be revised to incorporate the suggestions noted 
above.
3) The benefits of the recommendation (revised to incorporate the suggestions noted 
above) do outweigh the costs. From my experience as a CFO, I believe the 
incremental costs of implementing an appropriate standard would be very nominal 
and be greatly exceeded by the benefits of having an informed audit committee.
4) It would be desirable to recommend that the independence confirmation be 
delivered at the time that the auditor is appointed for the upcoming audit in order 
to permit timely discussion of any situations and/or services that might raise 
independence problems and the potential impact on the registrant so that an 
alternate auditor or method can be selected to resolve the independence issue. It 
should be noted that the auditor would in essence be re-confirming the earlier 
confirmation of independence at the conclusion of the audit through the issuance 
of the independent accountants opinion.
5) The dual approach appears to serve a valid purpose: that the requirement apply 
universally to all public companies. However, since the ISB has been recognized 
10 The ISB was recognized as the authoritative body to set independence guidance for auditors of public 
companies in Financial Reporting Release ("FRR”) No. 50 (February 18, 1998).
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as the authoritative body in the area of independence, the ISB could, if it desires to 
do so, issue its own guidance and thus circumvent the necessity to encourage the 
promulgation of independence guidance by other bodies lacking that authority.
The staff does not object to the Objective (Item 1), the Applicability (Item 2) nor 
the Recommended Confirmation Language (Item 4). However, the staff would suggest 
that the Proposed Recommendation (Item 3) be revised to incorporate the suggestions 
above.
The staff appreciates the opportunity to comment on your proposal and 
encourages your serious deliberation of these issues. If you have any questions, please 
feel free to call me, Bob Burns, or Scott Bayless at (202) 942-4400.
Sincerely,
Lynn E. Turner 
Chief Accountant
cc: A. A. Sommer, Jr.
Fidelity investments
Fidelity Management & Research Company
82 Devonshire Street 
Boston, MA 02109-3614 
Phone: 617 563-7000
December 17, 1998
William T. Alien, Chairman 
Independence Standards Board (ISB) 
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Attn: Exposure Draft (ED-98-1)
Dear Chairman Allen:
We appreciate having the opportunity to express our views on the proposal for requiring discussions between 
a company’s independent accountant and its audit committee. We are trustees of the Fidelity Group of 
Mutual Funds that comprises 242 individual funds, the audits of which arc divided between two firms of 
independent accountants.
The independence of auditors is of importance to trustees and directors in fulfilling their governance 
responsibilities. If it is discovered subsequent to the completion of an audit that an auditor has not complied 
with the voluminous, seemingly arcane, rules and regulations and regulators’ interpretations thereof, an audit 
may have to be reperformed by an independent firm. That is a costly and embarrassing event In addition, 
trustees and directors may wish to establish their own ground rules, apart from the regulatory requirements, to 
be assured in their own minds of the auditors’ independence in fact and appearance. The required discussion 
and communication that is being proposed by the ISB furnishes a starting point in addressing both of those 
points.
We at Fidelity have learned from our experiences over the last several years that compliance with the rules is, 
in certain circumstances, far from clear-cut. In addition, the expansion of both client and auditor activities 
makes policing of the relationships, particularly indirect ones, difficult. Based on our experiences we believe 
that the following should be included in the communications with the audit committee:
1. The relationships disclosed and discussed should include those between the auditor and its related 
entities and the company and its related entities. We recognize that defining the related entities may 
require careful thought. However, the independence rules do cover indirect relationships, and, 
therefore, it is important for trustees and directors to understand those relationships.
2. The discussion and disclosure should include a description by the auditors of its method of assuring 
compliance with the various independence rules. We recognize that assuring compliance is not a 
simple task, especially for world-wide firms, but the firms’ clients need such assurances.
Robert Pozen, President McDonough,  Donald Kirk,
Fidelity Management & Chairman of the Independent Chairman of the Audit
Research Company Trustees Committee
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND INSURANCE 
TENNESSEE STATE BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY 
DAVY CROCKETT TOWER, 2nd FLOOR
500 JAMES ROBERTSON PARKWAY 
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE 37243-1141 
615-741-2550 OR FAX 615-532-8800
November 17, 1998
Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, NY 10036-8775
ATTN: ED 98-1
Dear Board:
I have received your letter of November 12th with which you forwarded your Exposure Draft entitled, 
“Independence Discussions with Audit Committees.”
I agree with your decision to issue this document as an Invitation to Comment to an Exposure Draft of a Board 
pronouncement You are, after all, the Independence Standards Board. As such you enter the regulatory 
realm and certainly, as a Board, should have the authority to issue pronouncements on standards.
And I agree with your wording of the proposal. As a layman (think “potential client”) I would rather have this 
meeting between the auditor and audit committee held before the audit is started but I also understand the 
reasons that you opted not to require that early a meeting.




Author: MIME:EdRockman@csi.com at INTERNET
Date: 11/23/98 5:33 PM
Priority: Normal
TO: ISB at AICPA3
Subject: Exposure Draft (ED 98-1)
I previously responded to the Invitation to Comment on this subject. In 
that response, I objected to the boilerplate nature of the proposed 
confirmation of independence. I also objected to any referral of the matter 
to the Auditing Standards Board. I believe that the new ED is an 
improvement from the Invitation.
The ED attempts to encourage a real substantive dialogue between the auditor 
and the audit committee about independence issues. However, I would suspect 
that the real effect will be even more salutary than the stated goal. 
Auditors, by nature, hate to report negatives. Therefore, auditors will do 
everything they can to avoid having any disclosable conditions, which may be 
an improvement in performance, rather than just in communication. In the 
end, I doubt that much new will be reported, but behaviors may change for the 
better.
I would like to comment also on the requirement for a "discussion." The ED 
talks about requiring a discussion. It takes two to have a discussion. I 
don't see how this can be made operational when it only governs the auditor. 
There is an old expression, "you can lead a horse to water, but you can't 
make him drink." The auditor may try to start a discussion, but can he or 
she force it? If the auditor reports and the audit committee just listens, 
with no comment, is that a discussion? If it isn't, does the auditor have 
to do something because there was no discussion, and if so what?
I also believe that the ED could do a better job of describing its goals. I 
have read it several times, and it does not specifically and explicitly 
encourage an in depth dialogue. I would like to see a better articulation 
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This has reference to your letter of 11/17/98 regarding Exposure Draft 
98 -1, Communication with Audit Committees. Thank you for inviting me to 
comment. In October the NACD, working in concert with the Center for Board 
Leadership, identified a group of experts in the field of corporate governance and 
financial reporting and control to comprehensively examine the role of the audit 
committee. This blue ribbon commission held its first meeting on November 11 
and expects to complete its work and publish a report in the spring of 1999. 
Communications between the external auditors and various interested 
constituencies will be addressed in that report. My purpose in providing this 
background is to explain that my thoughts as expressed in this letter may not 
parallel the official position of NACD, as it will be reflected in the 1999 report.
I fully support the proposition that independent auditors should be 
routinely required to disclose “all relationships between the auditor and the 
company, including personal relationships that may reasonably be thought to bear 
on independence. ." I also believe that all other financial dealings (e.g. consulting, 
related party engagements) should be included in these disclosure requirements. 
Finally, the exposure draft limits this disclosure to the audit committee, or in their 
absence, the full board. I believe this should be expanded to include the 
corporation’s shareholders.
Thank you again for giving me an opportunity to comment on this very 
important subject.
Sincerely,
James J. Darazsdi 
Interim President & Chairman
Accountants and 
Management Consultants






1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, New York 10036-8775
Attn: ED 98-1
Gentlemen:
Grant Thornton is pleased to provide comments to the Independence Standards Board 
about ED 98-1, Independent Discussions with Audit Committees.
In general, we support the Board’s efforts to have the auditor confirm his or her 
independence to the Audit Committee (or the Board of Directors) of a client company 
annually. However, we have the following specific comments about the proposal:
1. The standard should specifically permit reporting to be made at the same time as other 
required communications, such as those required by SAS 61. The communications 
specified by SAS 61 are not required to occur before the issuance of the auditor's report 
on the entity's financial statements. However, the proposal requires the communication 
to be made “during the course of the annual audit.” It is not clear whether a 
communication made after the issuance of the auditor’s report (but sufficiently timely for 
purposes of SAS 61 communications) is deemed to be “during the course of the annual 
audit.”
2. It is unclear from the ED whether the ISB would consider independence to be impaired 
if either a written report was not issued or the mandated discussion was not held. We 
believe that the failure to comply with the standard, although a violation of professional 
standards, should not, in and of itself, be considered to result in an independence 
impairment. However, if the ISB does, in fact, believe independence would be 
considered to be impaired as a result of noncompliance with this standard, we suggest 
that the Board also consider the effects of the audit committee failing to appropriately 
respond to the auditor’s request for a discussion. Also, we urge the ISB to consider if 
the impairment would be “cured” through compliance at a later date.
3. We object to the requirement that the report be in writing. The proposal should be 
sufficiently flexible to allow oral communications, provided such communications are 
documented. Oral communications are permitted by SAS 61 and to have different 
requirements would be confusing to both auditors and audit committees. It would not,
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in our view, bring any less focus within audit firms on independence issues if the report 
is not delivered in written form.
4. The requirement to disclose all relationships, including personnel relationships that may 
reasonably be thought to bear on independence, is onerous and may be unworkable. 
There are many types of permitted relationships and the phrase “that may reasonably be 
thought to bear on independence” does not give guidance as to what types of permitted 
relationships bear on independence and what types do not. In addition, the standard 
should make it clear that it is the auditor who ultimately is responsible to make the 
decision as to whether a relationship “may reasonably be thought to bear on 
independence.” Also, while we understand the ISB may want the types of management 
consulting services that are provided reported, it is unclear if all other services outside 
the annual audit need to be disclosed, including for example, tax services both for the 
client and its officials. In addition, the fees received for some of these services may be 
de minimis and in no way be thought to bear on independence by reasonable people. In 
addition, it may be onerous to even gather this information in the case of multinational 
or multioffice engagements. Our objection would be lessened if the Board decided that 
certain relationships where fees received were not material to the audit fee did not have 
to be specifically disclosed. Finally, it is unclear whether matters previously reported to 
the audit committee would need to be reported on an annual basis, and for how long. 
For example, if a manager joins the client as its controller and this is reported in the first 
year, would this need to be reported in the second year, and the third year, and the tenth 
year?
5. It is unclear whether this standard would be applicable to foreign auditors. We suggest 
the ISB carefully consider whether or not it should be applicable to them because of the 
logistical and cultural differences that pertain to a foreign auditor.
6. Whether or not the Board intends to require a report to be in writing, an illustrative 
report should be provided similar to the illustration in the previously exposed Proposed 
Recommendation to the SECPS Practice Section.
7. Finally, the basis for the ISB’s statement that the “costs to implement this 
pronouncement would be small, particularly when compared with the benefits” is not 
clear to us. While the requirements of the standard may be of benefit when an auditor is 
also performing other types of services, the benefits of applying the standard is less clear 
for many thousands of SEC registrants for whom this is not the case, especially since, as 
it pertains to these registrants, there is no perceived need for this standard.
We would be pleased to discuss our views with the Board or its staff further. Please contact 
John Archambault, National Director of Professional Standards, at 312-856-0001, or Barry 




Walter Orenstein Certified Public Accountant
98-10 64th AVENUE 
FOREST HILLS, N. Y 11374
718-897-5884
November 24, 1998
Mr. William T. Allen, Chairman 
Independence Standards Board 
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor 
New York, New York 10036-8775
Re: ED 98-1
Dear Mr. Allen:
Since the highest degree of importance is placed on independence, a CPA 
should make a statement for each audit engagement as contained in the pro­
posal, stating such independence in writing with respect to a specific company 
within the meaning of the Securities Acts. The term "confirm" is ambiguous 
because a confirm can be oral or in writing.
If the auditor is required to disclose in writing all relationships 
between the auditor and the company why not require a confirm in writing of 
the auditor's independence.
If no relationship exists between the auditor and the client relating to 
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Mr. William T. Allen, Chairman 
Independence Standards Board 
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, New York 10036-8775
Re: ED 98-1
Dear Mr. Allen:
The highest degree of importance is placed on the independence of the CPA. The current 
proposal requiring the CPA to "confirm" his independence must be in the form of a written 
confirmation of independence. This written confirmation should disclose any relationship(s) 
between the auditor and the company e.g., tax or consulting services, and also state why the 





Gregory J. Lavin, CPA
FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES 
INSTITUTE
Susan M. Koski-GraferVice-President - Professional Development December 4, 1998and Technical Activities
Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, NY 10036-8775
Attn: ED 98-1
The Committee on Corporate Reporting (CCR) of the Financial Executives Institute appreciates the 
opportunity to comment on the ISB Exposure Draft 98-1 on Independence Discussions with Audit 
Committees. We support meaningful discussions between the audit committee and the independent 
accountant on issues that might impact independence in addition to the issuance of an annual 
independence confirmation. We believe that open communication will enhance the understanding 
of the issues and will benefit all parties. In this regard, we believe that it is desirable to clarify the 
reference to personnel relationships (e.g. what are the intended parameters).
Sincerely,
Susan Koski-Grafer 
Vice President-Professional Development and Technical Activities




Sam M. Walton Leadership Chair 
College of Business Administration
December 3, 1998
301 Business Administration Building 
Fayetteville, Arkansas 72701 
(501)575-5949 
(501) 575-4435 (FAX)
Independence Standards Board 
ATTN: ED 98-1 
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor 
New York, NY 10036-8775
As a member of the audit committee of a publicly held company, I’m writing to object to the issuance of 
ED 98-1. The proposal does not address the standards for independence. Independence is a concept of 
relationships; this proposal does not define standards for relationships that would impair independence 
or objectivity. Failure to follow this proposal would have no bearing on whether the auditor is 
independent or on the auditor’s relationship with the client.
If it is deemed that the proposal has merit, it should be issued by the AICPA SEC Practice Section, since 
the proposal addresses a practice (performance) standard.
Further, the proposal is vague in several respects. For example, “during the course of the audit,” is 
unclear. I can see a need for the issues to be discussed at the beginning of the audit. I can also see a 
need for such discussions to take place at the time of issuance of the report. The proposal should 
directly address this issue.
The term “personnel relationships” is unclear. Does “personnel relationships” include “personal 
relationships?” If so, how far are these relationships extended for purposes of this proposal? For 
example, to what extent do such relationships include business, professional or social relationships?
The responsibilities of the audit committee are unclear in this proposal. Are such discussions to be 
documented in the minutes of the audit committee? Are other responsibilities envisioned?
With respect to the final sentence in the proposal, the auditor is currently required to disclose any lack of 
independence in its audit report, suggesting that this provision is redundant.
I hope these comments are helpful.
Sincerely,  
Doyle Z. Williams 
Dean
A:\ED9811tr.wpd
The University of Arkansas is an equal opportunity/affirmative action institution.
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Arthur Andersen LLP 





1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, NY 10036-8775
Re: ED 98-1
Dear Board Members:
We applaud the recommendation of the Independence Standards Board to require the 
independent auditor to more fully communicate with a company's audit committee concerning 
the auditor's independence. Increased information to and communications with audit 
committees (or the board of directors if there is no audit committee) is, without question, highly 
desirable. We are fully supportive of a requirement to provide the kind of written 
communication that is proposed and believe that an annual discussion with the audit 
committee is also desirable and would be very beneficial in enhancing the effectiveness of many 
audit committees. We do, however, have several comments on the exposure draft for your 
consideration.
The exposure draft provides that the auditor should discuss the auditor's independence with 
the company's audit committee during the course of the annual audit. We suggest deleting the 
reference to "during the course of the annual audit" and replacing it with an annual 
requirement. Some audit committees may prefer that the required discussions take place before 
the annual audit begins, others after the date of the auditors' report. An annual requirement 
would adequately serve the objectives of ensuring (1) improved corporate governance, and 
(2) increased focus by the auditor on independence issues. Accordingly, we recommend that 
"during the course of the annual audit" be deleted from that sentence and the word "annually" 






The exposure draft indicates that the auditor is required to disclose "all relationships, including 
personnel relationships, that may reasonably be thought to bear on independence." We have 
two editorial suggestions with respect to this phrase. First, the reference to "including 
personnel relationships" should be deleted. The inclusion of the word "all" makes this reference 
unnecessary, and it raises questions as to whether "personnel" or "personal" relationships was 
intended. Since both may bear on independence, nothing is added by singling out this one type 
of relationship. Second, we recommend that the phrase be clarified so that it is clear that it is 
the auditor who is required to determine what bears on independence and to disclose and 
discuss what he or she believes may reasonably bear on independence, recognizing that an 
audit committee may require additional information it deems appropriate. This clarification 
can easily be accomplished with the following insertion: Specifically, "the auditor shall disclose, 
in writing, all relationships between the auditor and the company that he or she concludes may 
reasonably be thought to bear on independence, including any specific relationships that the 
audit committee wants considered, so that the audit committee and the auditor can discuss 
them." Providing more clarity on that phrase is particularly important since we believe it was 
the intent of the ISB, as implicitly stated in the exposure draft's background section, to require 
the auditor to identify those "judgmental matters that might impact on independence."
Finally, because the Board's proposal requires discussions with the audit committee, we believe 
the proposed standard is a desirable behavioral standard rather than a practical or principle­
based independence standard. We urge the Board to consider not requiring the completion of a 
discussion as a condition of maintaining auditor independence unless it also clearly addresses 
the consequences when the required discussion does not take place. If that cannot be addressed 
in a clear and practical manner without raising undue compliance and enforcement-related 
questions for SEC registrants and auditors, then we believe the Board should consider deleting 
a mandatory discussion requirement, adopting a requirement that the auditor offer to have a 
discussion, or going back to its original and more practical proposal of pushing for an SECPS 
membership requirement. The last option, in our judgment, would be the most effective means 
of achieving the Board's objectives without creating many unintended and unnecessary 
complications.
We appreciate the opportunity to provide comments on this exposure draft and would be 
happy to discuss our suggestions and comments with you or your staff at any time. Please feel 
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COMMENTS ON INDEPENDENCE STANDARDS BOARD EXPOSURE DRAFT ED 98-1
General comments
In my letter on the invitation to comment (ITC) on this subject I stated that an auditor’s confirmation 
of independence to its client was redundant since it basically duplicated the auditor’s representation 
in the standard audit report that an independence in mental attitude was maintained throughout the 
audit. Merely imposing an unstructured “discussion” about “relationships that may . . . bear on 
independence” without stating any objective, purpose or desired conclusion from the discussion is 
unlikely to lead to the hoped-for result. Requiring the auditor to state that its statement that it is 
independent is based on its professional opinion does not change this conclusion.
Issue Confirmation by the audit firm that it is independent is redundant, as the auditor already 
confirms this as part of the standard audit report. The audit committee (AC) should conclude the firm 
has not impaired its independence.
Suggestion This portion of the ED should be deleted.
Commentary Reminding audit committees of their responsibility to evaluate the independence of 
their external auditor is a worthwhile objective, but a strategy based primarily on an auditor 
confirmation is unlikely to achieve it. As the SEC ITC comment letter states: “a mere confirmation 
by the auditor is insufficient.” The Illinois CPA Society comment letter says: “(The proposal] 
provides little benefit.” The AICPA comment calls it “a small step.” The Crowe Chizek ITC letter 
states: “(a confirmation] will slightly increase attention to independence issues ”
Comments About au Independence Discussion
Issue Requiring the auditor provide the AC information on relationships bearing on independence 
fails to provide sufficient information needed by the AC so it has insight on all matters that might 
impact on the independent mental attitude auditors must maintain as required by generally accepted 
auditing standards.
Suggestion The ED should require the auditor to identify and communicate to the audit committee 
the details of all circumstances posing a threat or risk to independence and objectivity. The European 
Profession Common Core Principles for Statutory Audit Independence and Objectivity suggests this
approach and categorizes these threats or risks into five categories: Self-Interest, Self-Review, 
Advocacy, Familiarity or Trust, and Intimidation This document was published as of July 1998 by 
the Federation des Experts Comptables Europeens (FEE) in Brussels. It also suggests independence, 
must encompass both independence of mind and independence of appearance
Commentary As recognized by the FEE, the independence required by auditors so  
that they act objectively is a behavioral condition, not entirely a matter of relation - 
DePaul
   
ships. Globalization of capital markets demands that the best practices useful to assuring 
auditor independence be harmonized on a world-wide basis. The ISB should take advantage of the 
deliberations of their European counterparts on common issues like auditor independence
Issue As stated in the board’s Basis for Conclusions, many respondents to the earlier invitation to 
comment suggested that auditors communicate the "important matters considered in reaching a 
conclusion that independence was maintained.” The ED is not responsive to this concern because it 
does not suggest that the auditor provide to the audit committee information as to the supporting 
rationale for the auditor’s conclusion how it has maintained an independent mental attitude 
Suggestion The ED should require the auditor to describe the safeguards which have been put into 
place to offset all of the threats and risks communicated in each of the five risk categories The FEE 
document previously referred to states that "auditors should always consider the use of safeguards 
which may negate or reduce” any such threats or risks. It suggests firms take both external and 
internal steps. Internal steps include maintaining an overall control environment of quality and ethics 
taking into account the assurance provided by "a regularly monitored and evidenced control system.” 
Other steps include the elements of a well-designed ethics program..
Commentary Again, the ISB should take advantage of the best and most recent world-wide thinking 
on the subject of auditor independence.
Issue The ED is unreasonably focused on process rather than results or objectives. Although 
providing an opportunity for ACs to discuss independence issues, the ED outlines no purpose or 
objective for such discussion. Thus, the discussion is likely to be unproductive, possibly stereotyped 
and weak.
Suggestion It would seem to be a reasonable expectation that a structure be established for the AC 
discussion and an objective stated. The auditor should assert that the described safeguards in place 
do provide reasonable assurance that the independence of the firm and its representatives has not been 
impaired. After questioning the auditor and deliberating, the AC should be able to conclude that the 
auditor has addressed in reasonable fashion each of the threats and risks to maintaining independence 
in appearance and mental attitude. This process should provide assurance to the AC that the company 
has met the statutory requirement to engage an independent accountant.
Commentary The proposal as stated will not necessarily improve corporate governance as the ED 
states by merely requiring a discussion designed to "deepen AC understanding of auditor 
independence issues.” Improved corporate governance will only result if ACs engage in a robust 
evaluative discussion with the auditor which would allow a conclusion to be reached as to the 
auditor’s independence.
Conclusion
I do not favor issuance of the exposure draft
Respectfully submitted,  
Curtis C. Verschoor, EdD, CPA, CMA, CIA, CFE 
Ledger & Quill Research Professor, DePaul University
THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNAL AUDITORS
William G. Bishop III, CIA
President
December 21, 1998
Arthur Siegel, Executive Director 
Independence Standards Board 
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor 
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Art:
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the Independence Standards Board’s (ISB) 
Exposure Draft (ED) on Independence Discussions with Audit Committees (ED 98-1). 
As in our earlier response to the ISB’s Invitation to Comment 98-1 on the proposed 
recommendation to the SEC Practice Section, we still do not favor issuance of this 
standard in its present form. Our comments are as follows:
General comment
In our previous comment letter on this subject we stated that an auditor’s 
confirmation of independence to its client basically duplicated the representation made in 
the standard audit report that an independence in mental attitude was maintained 
throughout the audit. Requiring the auditor to provide relationship information and state 
that this conclusion is based on the auditor’s professional opinion does not change our 
opinion. Merely providing the opportunity for an unstructured discussion without a stated 
purpose is unlikely to lead to any beneficial conclusion.
Specific comments
1. Issue Requiring the auditor to provide the audit committee (AC), all relationships 
bearing on independence fails to provide insight to the AC on all matters that might impact 
on the independent mental attitude auditors must maintain as required by generally 
accepted auditing standards.
Suggestion The auditor should identify and communicate to the audit committee all 
situations posing a threat or risk to independence and objectivity. The European 
Profession Common Core Principles for Statutory Audit Independence and Objectivity 
suggests this approach and categorizes these threats or risks into five categories: Self- 
Interest, Self-Review, Advocacy, Familiarity or Trust, and Intimidation. This document 
was published as of July 1998 by the Federation des Experts Comptables Europeens 
(FEE) in Brussels. This document also suggests independence must encompass both 
independence of mind and independence of appearance.
Commentary Globalization of capital markets suggests that the best practices useful to 














advantage of the deliberations of their European counterparts on common issues like 
auditor independence.
2. Issue As stated in the board’s Basis for Conclusions, many respondents to the earlier 
invitation to comment suggested that auditors communicate the “important matters 
considered ... in reaching a conclusion that independence was maintained.” The ED is not 
responsive to this concern because it does not give the audit committee information as to 
the supporting rationale for the auditor’s conclusion how it has maintained an independent 
mental attitude.
Suggestion The auditor should describe the safeguards which have been put into place 
to offset each of the threats and risks communicated in each of the five risk categories. 
The FEE document previously referred to states that “auditors should always consider the 
use of safeguards which may negate or reduce” any such threats or risks. It suggests firms 
take both external and internal steps. Internal steps include maintaining an overall control 
environment of quality and ethics taking into account the assurance provided by “a 
regularly monitored and evidenced control system.” Other steps include the elements of a 
well-designed ethics program.
Commentary Again, the ISB should take advantage of the best world-wide thinking on 
the subject of auditor independence.
3. Issue The ED is overly focused on process rather than results or objectives. Although 
providing an opportunity for ACs to discuss independence issues, the ED outlines no 
purpose or objective for such discussion. Thus, the discussion is likely to be weak and 
unproductive.
Suggestion It would seem to be a reasonable expectation that a structure be established 
for the AC discussion and an objective stated. The auditor should assert that the described 
safeguards in place do provide reasonable assurance that the firm’s independence has not 
been impaired. After questioning the auditor and deliberating, the AC should be able to 
conclude that the auditor has addressed in reasonable fashion each of the threats and risks 
to maintaining an independent mental attitude. This process should provide assurance to 
the AC that the company has met the statutory requirement to engage an “independent” 
accountant. The ISB should consider issuing guidance concerning a stated objective along 
with a structured discussion agenda.
Commentary The proposal as stated will not necessarily improve corporate governance 
as the ED states by merely requiring a discussion designed to “deepen AC understanding 
of auditor independence issues.” Improved corporate governance will only result if ACs 
engage in a robust evaluative discussion with the auditor which would allow conclusions 
to be reached.
4. Issue Confirmation by the audit firm that it is independent is redundant, as the auditor 
already confirms this as part of the standard audit report.
Suggestion This portion of the ED should be deleted.
Conclusion
We do not favor issuance of this standard in its present form.
The IIA is an international organization comprised of nearly 70,000 internal auditing 
professionals in 120 countries. It is the only organization dedicated solely to the 
advancement of the individual internal auditor and the internal auditing profession. The 
IIA is the world leader in research and education for internal auditors and is the standards- 
setting body for the internal auditing profession.
Best Regards,
cc: Executive Committee 
Professional Issues Committee
DEC-22-1988 18:56 A.I.C.P.A. 1 800 329 1112
Division for CPA Arms
December 22, 1998
Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, NY 10036-8775
Attn: ED 98-1
Gentlemen:
The AICPA's SEC Practice Section Executive Committee (SECPS) is pleased to submit 
this comment letter to the Independence Standards Board with regard to ED 98-1, 
Independence Discussions with Audit Committees.
The SECPS supports the Board’s proposal to have the auditor confirm its independence 
with the audit committee (or Board of Directors) of the client company on an annual 
basis. The SECPS believes this will increase communication with audit committees and 
improve their understanding of auditor independence.
The SECPS may decide to provide future best practices guidance if that is considered 
necessary to deal with implementation matters.
We have other comments on the proposal.
1. Not all audit committees, or Boards where there is no audit committee, may be 
willing or able to meet with the auditor to discuss independence. There is no 
requirement on the part of audit committees to meet with the auditors to have such a 
discussion and the auditor cannot compel such a meeting. Accordingly, the proposal 
should indicate that if the audit committee does not meet with the auditor, the auditor 
nevertheless can still be deemed to have complied with this requirement if the auditor 
prepares the letter and requests the discussion with the audit committee, even though 
the audit committee may cause no discussion to occur. (This also will cover, for 
example, a situation where an auditor is terminated before the discussion with the 
audit committee occurs so that an independent audit may still be deemed to have 
occurred.)
2. It may be the wish of the audit committee to have a designated representative, such as 
the chairman of the audit committee, meet with the auditor and then convey the 
substance of this meeting to the full audit committee. The ISB proposal should allow 
for this possibility by indicating that, if it is the desire of the audit committee, the 
auditor can satisfy the requirement by communicating with the designated 
representative rather than having a discussion with the full audit committee.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Harborside Financial Center. 201 Plaza Three. Jersey City. NJ 07311-3881 (201) 938-3030 • (212) 318-0500 • fax (201) 938-3056
DEC-22-1398 18:56 A. I.C.P.A. 1 800 328 1112 P.03/04
3. The proposal is unclear as to what entities will be covered. The proposal is broad as 
it applies to any auditor intending to be considered an independent accountant with 
respect to a specific company within the meaning of the Securities Acts administered 
by the SEC. For example, as written the proposal may apply to municipalities, 
companies with private placement offerings, private companies being acquired by a 
SEC registrant, foreign registrants, banks filing with other Federal regulatory 
agencies, employee benefit plans, or broker - dealers, each of whom may be argued 
to have some possible applicability “within the meaning of the Securities Acts”. The 
SECPS definition of a SEC client does not cover all such entities. The ISB may wish 
to slightly limit the scope of the proposal. We suggest that the ISB consider whether 
its purpose will adequately be served if this requirement initially is defined to cover 
the vast majority of companies for which independence is intended within the 
meaning of the Securities Act, such as perhaps those companies listed on an 
exchange, and to allow further study as to the proper applicability to employee benefit 
plan registrants, non-public companies being acquired, foreign entities, etc. It would 
greatly aid practitioners if the definition were the same as the SECPS definition.
4. The proposal requires disclosure of all relationships between the auditor and the 
company and highlights “personnel relationships.” Given that all relationships that 
may reasonably be thought to bear on independence are required to be disclosed, we 
fail to see the need to highlight personnel relationships. Singling out “personnel” 
relationships seems to serve no purpose, and therefore, we recommend that this clause 
be deleted.
5. The phrase, “that may reasonably be thought to bear on independence”, is unclear as 
to who makes this determination. We recommend that the language be clarified to 
state “in the auditor's judgment may reasonably be thought to bear on independence”, 
to avoid controversy as to who makes, or can second-guess, this determination.
6. It is unclear what period is meant by “during the course of the annual audit.” We 
understand that the Board intended for this requirement to be flexible in order to meet 
the needs of the audit committee, and therefore, the standard should clarify the intent 
of the Board. We recommend that “during the course of the annual audit” be deleted 
and the word “annually” be added at the end of the sentence. Otherwise, we fear that 
the auditor may not be deemed independent if this communication occurs before the 
commencement of, or after the completion of, the audit fieldwork. Such a change 
also might eliminate the need to describe how a failure to communicate “during the 
course of the annual audit” could be cured (see 7 below).
7. The proposal doe not address the consequences of what happens if the auditor does 
not make the required communication. Is independence impaired? If so, how can 
this impairment be cured?
DEC-22-1998 18:57 A.I.C.P.A. 1 800 329 1112 P.04/04
The SECPS appreciates this opportunity to comment. I would be pleased to discuss these 
comments and any other matters with respect to the Board’s proposal if you so desire.
Sincerely,









Response to ED 98-1, Independence Discussions with Audit Committees 
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, New York 10036-8775
Dear Board Members:
I know about your work from your website, and reading the documents you 
posted led me to write this letter. There are several questions I thought you should 
have answered.
I cannot reconcile the Board’s Operating Policies with the exposure draft. So far as 
I can tell, the ISB was not set up to improve corporate governance, and that is 
the proposal’s stated purpose. The project appears inconsistent with the Board’s 
constitution.
The exposure draft says: “The Board believes that the proposed pronouncement 
would improve corporate governance by affording to audit committees a 
mandated opportunity to deepen their understanding of auditor independence 
issues. Companies are required by the Acts to engage ‘independent’ accountants, 
and this proposal will assist directors in satisfying themselves that the company 
has met that requirement.” Nothing in the Operating Policies says the ISB should 
improve the qualifications and performance of audit committee members.
The proposed standard imposes an obligation on audit committees (“Such an 
auditor and the audit committee of the company (or the board of directors if 
there is no audit committee) shall, during the course of the annual audit, discuss 
the auditor’s independence”). How would ISB standards bind audit committees?
You should explain why you are changing the structure of independence regulation. 
The exposure draft’s reporting and discussions would create opportunities for 
audit committees to evaluate independence. Some audit committees would 
evaluate audit independence, and others would not. The result would be to 
substitute a system with incidental committee evaluations for a uniform system of 
compliance with rules. Compliance with requirements would be less important than 
audit committee attitudes. You should explain how you concluded this unevenness 
is justified and why downgrading the importance of SEC rules this way makes 
sense.
You said in the Invitation to Comment that audit committee members are not 
equipped to evaluate audit independence. Since the exposure draft would probably 
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1211 Avenue of the Americas
6th Floor
New York, NY 10036-8775
Attention: ED98-1
Gentlemen:
We would agree with the proposal except in so far as it relates to personal relationships. 
We believe that it is a fairly widespread practice at this time for the Audit Committee to 
review the various business relationships with the auditors before recommending them 
for appointment. This system is working well and should not be disturbed except for 
good reason.
The addition of a requirement for disclosure of personal relationships would put the 
Audit Committee in the difficult position of assessing the relative importance of a variety 
of relationships between individuals. Whether or not such relationships would have a 
bearing on the independence of an auditing firm with multiple partners and employees is 
a relevant question. At best such an inquiry would most likely lead to a change of 
engagement partner although the present checks and balances in place in audit firms 
might make even that step unnecessary in many cases.
In sum we believe that the adoption of the proposal would not change present practice 
and would in fact add a disruptive element that would not be to the advantage of 
investors.
Very truly yours,
